

# Naval War College Review

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# NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

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
## FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College.

The material contained in the *Review* is for the professional education of its readers. The frank remarks and personal opinions of the lecturers and authors are presented with the understanding that they will not be quoted. The remarks and opinions shall not be published nor quoted publicly, as a whole or in part, without specific clearance in each instance with the lecturer or author and the Naval War College.

Lectures are selected on the basis of favorable reception by Naval War College audiences, usefulness to service-wide readership, and timeliness. Research papers are selected on the basis of professional interest to readers.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the lecturers and authors, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or of the Naval War College.



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
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## SEAPOWER IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

A lecture delivered at the Naval War College  
on 19 May 1966 by  
Professor William A. Reitzel

This may not seem a particularly good time to talk about the Mediterranean. Various members of the free world are not exactly on the best possible terms. One of their key associations, NATO, is in some disorder—its future form a little uncertain. And it would certainly not be easy at this time to define a common interest with which all would agree.

In spite of these drawbacks, I think that this may be a very good time to talk about the Mediterranean. Circumstances force us to take a fresh look at a situation that time has perhaps made too familiar; perhaps our established formulas no longer fit the facts. The confusions of the moment may give us a chance to get back to basic considerations. At any rate, I'm going to treat the present state of affairs as an opportunity for exploration.

The discussion arranges itself in three parts: (1) an examination of strategic significance; (2) a discussion of free world and related interests; and (3) the application of seapower, or, to put it in other terms, the strategic exploitation of the Mediterranean situation.

A distinction must be made between strategic significance and strategic exploitation.

Strategic significance is a pattern that develops from geographical relations, from political interaction between states, from particular forms of economic exchange, and finally from the shifting location of areas of critical conflict between states. It is the situation that is presented to us for action.

Strategic exploitation, in contrast, is the product of conscious and deliberate human planning and action, aimed at achieving objectives in the situation thus presented. Effective *exploitation* clearly depends on an accurate interpretation of *significance*; a wrong interpretation can easily lead to a waste of resources and to strategic failure; a right interpretation can produce great rewards at relatively little cost.

I have always tried to be guided in analyzing a problem by a remark of Abraham Lincoln: "If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it." So in taking our three points in order: strategic significance, interests, strategic exploitation—the first two are concerned with *where* and *whither*; the third with *what* and *how*. First, strategic significance. At the risk of giving shock treatment, I'll start with a flat statement. No one, at this juncture in world affairs, can honestly say what the strategic significance of the Mediterranean actually is. The most he could reliably say would be: (1) none of the previously known historical patterns seem to apply; (2) a number of potentially significant possibilities exist; and (3) which of these possibilities will develop into a clear predominant strategic significance seems unpredictable at the present time. Let me illustrate what I mean.

The Mediterranean is a simple geographical fact. This fact has historically developed a variety of strategic significances. I have four such to show you. In each case, I'll give you the strategic pattern at its moment of sharpest definition.

Figure 1 illustrates the pattern at the peak period of the Roman Empire. It persisted from about 81 B.C.-800 A.D. It represents the true *Mare Nostrum* situation.

Note: 1. A land-based center of control.

2. Subordinate centers are reached by sea.

3. Sea movement of men and materials—civilian and military—is fully protected.

4. Peripheral pressures are relatively weak and disorganized, and force can be readily concentrated against them—in most cases by sea.

In Figure 2 you see the pattern of a Vertical Split. It is characteristic of the period from 300 A.D.-700 A.D.






Figure 1 - True *Mare Nostrum*, 30 B.C.-330 A.D.




Figure 2 - Vertical Split, 330-730 A.D.

- Note: 1. Two land-based centers of competing power, each subjected to mounting pressures on their peripheries.
2. The seapower they can assemble has divided objectives:
- (a) movement of each against the other
  - (b) movement of each against peripheral pressures.
3. A resulting effect of limited force widely dispersed and a highly unstable pattern inadequately exploited.

Figure 3 shows the pattern of a Horizontal Split. It represents the expansion of Islamic power on the southern littoral and the gradual organization of Christian-European power on the northern, with shifting back and forth on a sea frontier. It had a long lifespan as a pattern—from the 8th to the late 17th centuries.




Figure 3 - Horizontal Split, 730-1700 A.D.

- Note: 1. Land-based powers, north and south, contesting control, with their positions changing as control was gained or lost.
2. As Europe gradually increased in organization it gained superiority, and then internal European competition opened the way for the pattern that follows.



In Figure 4 you see a pattern that combined a major intrusion on the east-west axis with multiple vertical projections from Europe into Africa and the Levant. It persisted from the 18th well into the 20th century.




Figure 4 - Two-way Split, 1700-1935

- Note: 1. The horizontal intrusion (essentially British) was securely based on fixed points of control—two points of access with intermediate stations.
2. The vertical projections were competitive and, except at intervals, were not aimed at eliminating the horizontal intrusion.
3. As trade expanded quantitatively in the 19th century, the horizontal intrusion became an unrestricted international route firmly maintained by British naval power.

But, with these well-known historical strategic patterns behind us, we come to a question mark. What are we looking at now? The pattern in Figure 4 is plainly not the present picture.

First of all, what are the facts of the moment? (See Figure 5.)

1. There are no vertical projections south from Europe.
2. There is no horizontal intrusion based on fixed points of control.
3. Control of the accesses is divided.

4. There is an inserted naval power (United States) whose home base is remote that has no fixed points of control but has local alliance supports from European associates.

5. There are potentially important pressures on the periphery—Soviet-Communist from the northeast, Egyptian-Arab from the south.

6. There are now 15 sovereign states directly concerned with what happens in the Mediterranean. In many cases they pursue contradictory interests.




Figure 5 - 1945-1970?

With these facts before us, let me repeat my questions.

What is the strategic significance of the Mediterranean now?

Or, if you haven't a ready answer to that, what strategic pattern do you think is most likely to emerge in time?

Perhaps another question should be added: what pattern should the free world try to make emerge, or what pattern would be most favorable to its interests?

In answer to the first two questions, there is no clearly indicated pattern; and there are no sure grounds for prediction as to what will emerge. The third question can wait.

We are apparently in the early stages of what may be a long period of uncertainty. Former strategic guidelines no longer seem to apply. New strategic values are indeterminate. This, I believe, is the reality we now have to face. Strategic exploitation—the action aspect—can only be addressed to potentials, not to an unmistakably defined situation. That is, seapower must be applied to encourage and build up the potentials that would result in a favorable pattern; and equally to neutralize, or if need be to resist, developments that would be adverse. This is admittedly an uncomfortable situation for the planners of policy and the designers of strategy. It lacks the much-desired clarity that military thinking prefers. It is highly susceptible to unpredictable change. It calls for contingency arrangements and flexible responses.

However, such situations are normal in human affairs. Although they create strains, arguments, and trial-and-error moves, there are ways of living with them successfully. We know, for example, that in each of the historical cases, there was an initial long period of uncertainty. Then, a possible pattern was revealed to some discerning eye. Then, political-military minds began to see opportunities opening. Then, by shaping and concentrating resources on the exploitation of these opportunities, what had at first been only one of several potential patterns was converted into a dominating strategic significance. Objectives were now obvious, and the pattern could be exploited with confidence. We are no worse off than any of our predecessors. We can at least use our wits much as they did.

So, let us go on to the next item—a look at the alternative potentials. To get at these, we must consider the forces that are at work, that is, the interests that are involved, for it will be the actions that nations take to advance these interests that will tend to turn a potential into an established fact.

I have said, "Action to advance interests." But the matter is more complicated than that. It involves choosing which out of many interests should be pressed steadily and vigorously, and which can be safely given a lower priority.

In this connection it is worth noting that nations have many interests, and the order in which they value them is important. It is no unusual thing for a state to put a high value on a short-term political goal and by doing so to foreclose on a long-term goal—say of economic development—of greater real value.

But, to get back to the point: free world and related interests.

There are 15 sovereign states directly concerned with the Mediterranean. There are external interests—commercial, political, security—which include the trading states of Europe, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The United States represents a recently inserted economic and military influence, the Soviet Union a recently developed pressure on the periphery.

This complex of interests is grouped in a variety of ways, the mere listing of which is enough to show the difficulty of finding a stable common interest even for the associated states of the free world.

Some are linked with each other and with the U.S. in NATO.

Some are bilaterally associated with the U.S.

Some are loosely linked in an Arab political system.

Some are loosely associated with some Communist grouping.

Some are isolated operators.

Some have an identical interest because they control approaches to the Mediterranean, although they may have nothing else in common.

Some have an identical interest in an open sea route through the Mediterranean-Western Europe generally for the movement of oil, Great Britain for military movement as well.

Obviously, all of the interests implied here cannot be satisfied. In several instances, they cannot even be compromised. Although a common security interest drew some of these states together after World War II, we know that this is a common interest that can easily be eroded by short-term national interests. We have seen this happen in the cases of the Arab League and CENTO. We may be facing a similar erosion in the case of NATO.

In order to be significant, however, interests have to be actively pursued. And this raises the question of a state's capacity to carry on sustained action in the face of opposition.

Measured by modern standards of power—economic and military—the greater number of the Mediterranean states are secondary or lesser actors on the contemporary world stage. Measured between themselves, the long-established states of the European littoral can organize and apply more power—economic and military—than can the states of the African and Levantine littoral. Yet, taken one by one, nearly every Mediterranean state has some basis for believing it can act on what it takes to be its national interest with some hope of success. For some states, the basis is a local military superiority; for some it is control of a needed raw material, or of a vital strategic point. For others it is association with a more powerful neighbor. For all it is a comparative freedom to exercise political leverage—leaving room to maneuver, even in the face of obviously superior strength. If the freedom of action of any of these states is limited, it is limited much more by the other states of the region than by any actual American or any threatened Soviet presence.

But, turn to another set of facts—this time economic—and a different picture appears; one in which the basis of a common interest can be seen.

Some states, chiefly on the European littoral, are industrially organized; that is, they tend to be processors of finished goods. The rest tend to be producers of raw materials—oil, minerals, fibers, animal products, and so on. At the same time, all have set up an identical policy goal—economic development.

The European states aim at expanding their industrial base and at increasing their annual economic growth rates. The others aim at creating an industrial base and at increasing domestic consumption. And, in addition, the means by which all these states have pursued these goals have become more and more interlocking and mutually dependent. This could be demonstrated statistically, but there is no space for charts and figures. The point to be emphasized is that the pursuit of these goals over the past 15 years has resulted in an immense and steadily mounting movement of goods—raw and finished; led to sensitive dependence on the regularity and reliability of these movements for the maintenance and improvement of what has been widely defined as national well-being; and, although it is not generally talked about, steadily tended to give a higher priority to economic than to political goals. And, it should be added, well over 75 percent of this trade movement has been—as far as the Mediterranean is concerned—seaborne movement.

What does this add up to? Let's do a summary before we move on to the question of applying seapower. This interim summary will try to bring together the complex of interests and the potential strategic patterns to see if some useful generalizations can be made.

First, in respect to strategic potentials. The following are worth consideration:

1. No one of the states located in or near the Mediterranean has the means of enforcing a strategic pattern in its own exclusive interest. You cannot, for example, seriously foresee a true *Mare Nostrum* situation being developed.
2. No local combination of states can, in the near future, develop the means and the sustained impetus to establish a strategic pattern in an exclusive group interest. For example, you cannot easily envisage a Horizontal Split (as shown in Figure 3) being enforced by the Arab states of the southern littoral, nor the European States reestablishing vertical projections (Figure 4) and regaining political-military authority in North Africa or the Levant.
3. It is equally hard to accept as realistic the notion of the United States, or any other external state, developing a dominating influence based on the control of approaches and interior fixed points.

4. In contrast to these negative statements, there is a potential for splitting into eastern and western sections. A Soviet-Communist breakthrough into the Mediterranean Basin could produce this pattern, even though the intrusion was mainly political and economic. Such a development has several channels available—into the Adriatic, by way of Turkey, by way of a Levant state. Without treating this as likely, it must nevertheless be recognized as a rational contingency.

5. But, finally, there is a totally different possibility to be considered—the possibility that the numerous states most directly concerned may find the present indeterminate situation preferable to one in which a rigid strategic pattern has been established by a superior force and is hence open to continual exploitation by that power.

Let me examine this last point in more detail. I repeat that, in spite of divergent political aims, all the states directly concerned have a common economic objective; and that the pursuit of this goal depends in great part on the unrestricted movement of goods in and through the Mediterranean. Neutral, and even Communist-linked states, share this purpose as do many non-Mediterranean countries. No one of these states, even while they may be threatening one another with fire and sword, can safely wish for anything like a return to the days when the English, French, and Dutch fought naval wars on the simple principle of "the other has too much trade and we are resolved to take it from him."

It is possible, accordingly, to conceive that the strategic significance of the Mediterranean for some time to come may be shaped rather by the shared economic than by the disputed security considerations of the states directly concerned. At any rate, let us take this as a tentative conclusion and move on to the last major point—the application of seapower—or, putting it in other words, the maritime exploitation of the present situation in the interest of the free world.

Too many distinctions are a bad thing, but one more is needed here for the sake of clarity. Seapower can be a confusing and misleading term. It will be useful to separate it from naval power.

Seapower is the means by which a nation, or a group of nations, exploits the opportunities provided by movement on the seas. Its components are: merchant shipping, ship and repair yards, port facilities, access to motive power (coal, oil, nuclear), skilled personnel, and, lastly, the means to defend this movement.

Naval power is the means to defend; that is, the military component of seapower. Its primary function has been convoying and dealing with opposing naval forces, and maritime policing. Naval power, however, early developed other functions as a specialized element in a nation's military strength. These consisted of military transport, logistic support of land forces, amphibious operations, and, more recently, an air strike function, the projection of force far inland from the sea. More recently still an ICBM strike capacity has been developed.

There have always been competing claims on naval resources between its function in relation to seapower and its specialized military roles. This competition became so intense in the two last major wars as to be a basic constraint on strategic planning. And so it would be again in any prolonged conflict.

In considering the application of the seapower of the free world to the ambiguous situation in the Mediterranean, there are a few points worth stating in advance.

If we put on one side, for the moment, the naval component of seapower, the other equally essential components are chiefly provided by the members of NATO, other free world states, and by some neutral states. The United States contribution is small. These components are dispersed among a great many nations. Their operation is basically uncoordinated, and they cannot be readily brought under integrated control for strategic use. In short, free world seapower in the Mediterranean is a diffused strength. In spite of this diffusion, however, it has operated over recent years as the basis for the sustained economic development of its associated possessors. And it is a power that is possessed in a superior degree by the free world.

In marked contrast, the naval component, as far as the Mediterranean is concerned, is a highly concentrated form of strength. Its major elements have been provided by the United States, importantly supplemented by NATO contributions and supported by NATO facilities. The circumstances that brought this about are too well known to need repeating here. But, note that this component has been primarily thought of as exercising specialized military functions. It was organized as naval power in the strictly military sense to support a NATO flank, to act in a deterrence role, and to provide combat ready force. These were all related to a shared European-American security interest—security being commonly understood as the deterrence of Soviet-Communist aggression by the presence of a capacity to resist if deterrence failed. It is clear that naval power organized for these tasks was not effectively structured for the role of defending sea movement. Fortunately, sea movement was at no time threatened, though it was impeded at one moment by the nationalization of the Suez Canal.

Meanwhile, and in contrast, the seapower of the free world developed a special value in relation to the common economic interests of the free world states. Although European political influence in Africa and the Levant was steadily reduced, the expansion of economic exchanges built up new interrelations. These have generally survived political—and even some military—differences of opinion. And the binding influence has been the seapower of the free world—diffused and undirected as it has been.

Now, in the mid-1960's, although the strategic significance of the Mediterranean is as undetermined as at any time since World War II, it is possible to see a different focus for the application of seapower than the one that has prevailed for some years.



For example, to many analysts, especially to Europeans, the Soviet-Communist threat has receded from a possible to a very remote contingency. But, even more significantly, there has been a shift in the priorities given to national interests—economic growth and development being increasingly rated higher than security. With economic goals as a basic common interest, the focus for the use of seapower needs restatement. The objective should now be described as: (1) maintaining efficient and unrestricted sea movement, and (2) protecting sea movement against every form of interruption. This includes major or minor war, and especially unilateral national actions that block sea routes or create other impediments to movement. With such a focus, naval power would be clearly required to play its part as the defensive component of seapower. The specialized military functions it has been exercising in the Mediterranean would tend, in this context, to become a reserve function for contingency use.

Seapower, however, is not the possession of any one free world state. It is a composite power. Its value and its effective use depend on the maximum coordination of a large number of components, including the present U.S. naval component.

There has never been a clearer case for collaboration, whether for peace, cold war, or major conflict. The purpose is a widely shared one. There would be nothing unequal in a relationship geared to the use of seapower—unlike the relationships in an alliance geared to security. For in fact, the United States depends day in and day out on the composite seapower of the free world in as full a sense as the states of the free world and even many neutral states depend on the naval contribution of the United States. In many respects, the so-called neutral states are the most dependent of all; the smooth working of seapower is most critical for their economic well-being.

The mutuality of the dependence has tended to be obscured—even forgotten by the parties to it (and the United States must definitely be included in this forgetfulness)—by the fact that the naval component is obviously out in front for all to see, while the other equally vital components are dispersed, generally thought of only in other connections, and at all times work in slow, intangible ways. But, try for a minute to spell out the consequences of a breakdown in the operation of seapower. Imagine any one of its numerous components removed. The impact would be quickly felt in the work-a-day world, and any question of serious strategic exploitation would be impossible. The critical importance of even the present loose collaboration within the free world becomes apparent.

Now for the last point—the application of seapower.

Given what has already been said, the question we are asking ourselves is this: For what purposes and in what ways should the free world naval power be used in the Mediterranean in order to ensure that the seapower of the free world will continue to support free world interests?

In the most fundamental sense, the objective is to maintain unrestricted sea movement as essential to the economic well-being and hence to the political stability and military strength of the states of the free world. To put the key objective in these terms is to say that the major threats would take the form of interference with sea movement. Such threats could range from absolute stoppage to small impediments. I suggest that the general types of interference are as follows:

1. A general war involving the United States and Soviet Russia and their allies and associates. This would come as close to an absolute interruption as we need bother about.
2. A local conflict between two or more Mediterranean states. The interruption would be less than absolute, but would have a real impact on the economies of neighboring states.
3. Specific interferences resulting from the policies of individual states.

I shall want to discuss the application of naval power in each of these type situations. But before doing so, we'd better review what the free world has in the way of naval power in the Mediterranean. It is a composite power—a hard core of U.S. naval force structured chiefly for air and amphibious strikes and partially for antisubmarine tasks; joined with this are NATO contributions of smaller units—well adapted for the active defense of sea movement—and support facilities. The feature to concentrate on here is the mutual support required of every component. If all the elements are present and integrated, this composite force represents a power superior to anything that can be brought against it in the Mediterranean. But its value and its usefulness depend on all the components being continuously available. With this in mind, come back to the three types of threat.

**General War.** The obvious common interest of the free world—an interest that is profitable for neutrals also—is to deter a general war. This role in the Mediterranean has primarily fallen to the U.S. naval component; but make no mistake, the effectiveness of this material contribution would have been much reduced if it had not been for broad policy support by the free world.

Since we are looking at the future, let us assume for the moment that the deterrence role has failed. What then is the role of naval power—now acting as the defensive arm of seapower? The extent to which it might have to play a specialized military combat role is unpredictable. The Mediterranean could either be central or marginal in a general war, depending on the overall strategic pattern that developed. If central, obviously the military functions of naval power would take precedence. If marginal, the maintenance of sea movement would take precedence, and such naval forces as were organized for military combat roles would most likely be drawn away to the central theaters of action.

This brings up a crucial point. It is hard to imagine the Soviet Black Sea squadrons abandoning their defensive tasks and turning up in the Mediterranean as an offensive surface fleet. It is only too easy, however, to foresee Soviet-Communist submarine forces being committed to a strategic destruction of sea movement and creating for the free world an inescapable seapower defense task of considerable proportions. And this, it must be faced, is not a task to which the United States could contribute much as far as the Mediterranean is concerned. Yet the requirement for escort vessels, minesweepers, repair facilities—all available in quantity—would be basic, and the weight of furnishing these essential components would fall on the free world states of the region.

Parenthetically, if the general war were a Far Eastern one, with the Mediterranean free world not involved, while naval power in the Mediterranean would have only a remotely contingent combat function, the maintenance of sea movement would continue to be essential. Again the major burden would fall on the Mediterranean states.

**Local Conflict.** This could occur in as many varieties as there are states in the Mediterranean with conflicting political goals. But there would be common elements in all such conflicts. First, the actions of the states involved, by restricting general sea movement, would be contrary to the interests of all other states; second, any such conflict—given the uneasy nature of international relations—would contain a potential for expanding to major war. States not involved would accordingly have a common interest in confining, shortening, and resolving the conflict. This interest could be shared for the time being even by states with longer-term political differences.

Again, what is the applicability of naval power? While it cannot do much to prevent such conflict from breaking out, it can, if objectively and judiciously used, have a considerable value in limiting and bringing conflict to an end.

In no conceivable local conflict could the contestants assemble the means seriously to resist the pressures that the noninvolved states could bring to bear on them through the use of seapower. The techniques, of course, could be selected from a range of possible actions scaled from the withdrawal of trading facilities (economic sanctions) through blockade and policing of sea routes to intervention with quick-striking forces. The operational value of this pressure would be that it was exerted by multinational composite seapower in defense of the common interest of the many against the few whose actions were contrary to that interest. It would not be open to the charge—so disagreeable to modern opinion—of a single superior national force coercing smaller nations. The international political value of proceeding in this way, and on this ground, is very great indeed. But, for the kind of use of seapower suggested here, the burden would fall on the contribution of the regional states to the free world naval power. While the combat-ready U.S. contribution would be available, its role would be chiefly to deter intervention from the outside and to act as a reserve force. Since the effectiveness of the local policing forces would be increased by this implied reserve power, note again the essential interplay between the various components.

**Specific Interferences.** The obvious illustration of the kind of thing I have in mind here is the Egyptian closing of the Suez Canal to Israeli and Israeli-bound shipping. Equivalent interruptions can take a variety of forms—embargoes, customs, delays, nationalization of facilities, exercise of extended sovereignty over territorial waters, etc. Such actions would be deliberate policy decisions and would invariably affect a wide circle of bystander nations. But, above all, whether large or trivial, they would impede or restrict the sea movement which it would be to the general interest to keep as freely flowing as possible.

The free world, as an association of maritime and maritime-linked nations, has a continuing primary interest in unrestricted sea movement. It is not going too far to say that the use of its composite naval power to enforce the freedom of such movement would be a rational long-term free world policy and strategy. What would be the techniques and the requirements for applying naval power for this purpose?

The matter of means is simple. Even now, in spite of shortcomings, the combined civil and military seapower of the free world is adequate to maintain sea movement in the Mediterranean and its approaches. Given a relatively inexpensive buildup in the smaller naval categories, its superiority is not likely to be seriously challenged within the lifetime of any of us. And, especially in the Mediterranean, no one state—scarcely any imaginable group of states—could long withstand the pressure of such power.

Note one thing, however, with respect to means. The kind of naval contribution now made by the United States is out of scale for the sort of pressure envisaged. It is primarily geared to combat and not to what would essentially be a policing-enforcement function. Nor could the United States be expected readily to contribute the kind of forces needed—given other claims on its resources. The sort of contribution required belongs naturally to those states of the free world whose interests are centered in the Mediterranean.

The effective use of means is not, however, a simple matter. On the contrary, it would be difficult and delicate and would call for a great deal of political coordination. Since the power involved is a composite one, it could only be used to support a strategy that is agreed and for a purpose that is commonly shared. This power could not be employed to support the exclusive interest of any one member state—whether that interest was United States or Portuguese, Spanish or British, Turkish or Greek. Any idea that the composite power might be so used would immediately have the effect of breaking the combined strength up into its several national components, no one of which—not even that of the United States—would have a usefulness equal of that of the composite force. However, there is more involved than this. We are talking about a use of seapower that has many of the features of a police operation. That is, we are considering its use in situations where individual action runs counter to the interest of the many. This is familiar enough

in domestic society and is normally dealt with by government using its police power.

International society is admittedly not quite the same thing, although the concept of legal coercion is not entirely absent from international law, especially in maritime affairs. And, here we would have a comparable situation. There would be no question of a powerful state coercing a weaker. It would be a matter of a group of states using their combined power to insist that their common interest in sea movement—an interest, by the way, that is indirectly shared by others—shall not be interfered with. The power, in short, would be applied in a police sense to enforce on a recalcitrant state compliance with a general interest.

Pressure, even force, brought to bear on a local conflict in the name of defending a broad international interest, is a respectable position in international society. It is frequently done through the United Nations in the name of "removing threats to the peace." Its merits in connection with "removing threats to sea movement," exercised judiciously by a large group of maritime states on behalf of international society, is worth close study.

Admittedly, it would be no easy matter to develop an agreed seapower policy and strategy, or to direct and control its application in specific circumstances. Yet the free world has acquired some experience in such things. And the particular collaboration suggested here for the Mediterranean should be less difficult to work out than the infinitely more complex case of the security of Western Europe and the Atlantic area. For one thing, the objective can be clearly stated, readily understood, and commonly shared: it is to maintain essential, unrestricted sea movement against all threats and at all times. For another, the costs of developing and maintaining the means to support this purpose would not be out of proportion for any one contribution. And, finally, no question of inequality of role or influence could easily arise between the contributors. All of the components—merchant ships, naval units, maritime facilities—are equally vital in the structure of seapower and equally critical to the effectiveness of its application. Differences in the kind and scale of the elements contributed are unimportant when their mutual dependence is so easily recognized. Equality of influence is further emphasized by the fact that removal of an element—a Portuguese facility, a Spanish base, an Italian, Greek, or Turkish naval squadron—would lower the usefulness of free world seapower as much as would the withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

I am, of course, speaking of the year-in, year-out strategic application of seapower, and not of the deterrence-security function of naval forces. Yet, looked at objectively, the value to the free world interest of a specialized, combat-oriented naval force in the Mediterranean may be less in the long run than the influence of an adequately equipped, collaboratively organized, and discreetly applied seapower.


BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Professor William A. Reitzel was educated at Haverford College and New College, Oxford. He has been Professor of English and Professor of Social Sciences, Haverford College; Director, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Deputy Director, Yale Institute of International Studies; and Deputy Director, International Studies Group, Brookings Institution. The Professor has held the Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy at the Naval War College and has been a lecturer at all of the Service Colleges since 1947.

During World War II Professor Reitzel was a Commander in the U.S. Naval Reserve. He served in the European Theater; he was Special Naval Observer, liaison officer with the Free French Committee, and Secretary of the Naval Post Hostilities Committee in London. He also served as an Intelligence Officer in North Africa, was the Assistant Principal Salvage Officer in the Mediterranean, and was Flag Secretary and Political Liaison Officer in the Mediterranean and Germany.

Professor Reitzel served with the Central Intelligence Agency from 1948-50 and was a member of the Advisory Group to the National Board of Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, from 1954-57. He was also the Senior Civilian, Naval Long-Range Study Project at Newport, R.I., from 1960-65.

For the Yale Institute Professor Reitzel was author of various memoranda and *The Mediterranean, Its Role in U.S. Foreign Policy*. While at the Brookings Institution he was editor and author of various Policy Problem Papers; in addition he published five annual volumes of *Major Problems in U.S. Foreign Policy* and a book entitled *U.S. Foreign Policy*. He was also the project leader for *History of the United Nations Charter* and a staff participant in *Administration of Foreign Affairs* for the Bureau of the Budget and *Administration of Foreign Policy* for a Senate Committee. At the Naval War College the Professor was author of *Background to Decision-Making* and a lecture series on "Logic, Organization, and Administration of the Planning Process."



## **FLEXIBILITY—KEY TO OVERSEAS SUPPORT**

A Research Paper written by Captain Warren A. Skon, U.S. Navy  
School of Naval Warfare, 1966

### **INTRODUCTION**

The higher the level of thought, the more strategy and logistics tend to coalesce.<sup>1</sup>

The phrase "overseas support" is likely to conjure up in the minds of professional military men immediate visions of mountains of supply crates and fuel drums baking under a hot South Pacific or North African sun—or perhaps visions of endless lines of ships swinging at anchor in a crowded atoll, or of bulky cargo aircraft touching gently down on the hastily constructed runway at a busy overseas airfield.

The term overseas support as used herein will have broader application. In addition to mobile sea and air support, it embraces each type of military shore facility supporting our national interests from the smallest resident office or antenna site to the sprawling, multipurpose naval base.



Nor will the term support be restricted to its logistic connotation. Where problems in support spill over into political, strategic, and economic matters, these relationships will also be considered. A principal objective, in fact, is to determine whether political and military considerations should not be more closely related in the future, while shaping and framing our U.S. overseas military support efforts in a shrinking world. In a world of emerging nations and multiplying regional alliances and base rights agreements, do not the politic and the human values demand increased reckoning in military thinking?

Overseas shore support in the U.S. Navy will in particular be examined. We will review the types of overseas support, take a panoramic look at evolution in their use, discuss support problems which face us today, and finally focus on overseas support in tomorrow's world.

## I-TYPES OF SUPPORT

The best operational plan in the world is no better than its logistic support, and in turn logistic support, that is, the entire system of planning for and providing goods and services, is correspondingly dependent on the supply lines.<sup>1</sup>

"The No. 1 U.S. problem in Viet Nam at the moment is not the war but the wherewithal to fight the war, not the Communist enemy but the beans and bread, bullets and billets necessary for the daily support of 170,000 American fighting men." <sup>2</sup> This grim December 1965 appraisal of the logistic picture in Southeast Asia serves well to introduce the subject of overseas support and to portray one of the main problems entailed when an emergency arises in some remote corner of the world. That problem is logistics.

The JCS definition of logistics first published in 1953 is still in use:

LOGISTICS—In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

(a) Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of material.

(b) Movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel.

(c) Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities, and

(d) Acquisition or furnishing of services.<sup>3</sup>

This is indeed a comprehensive definition. Equally broad but more succinctly stated, logistics has been described as the "provision of the physical means by which power is exercised by organized forces. In

military terms, it is the creation and sustained support of combat forces and weapons." <sup>4</sup>

Proceeding from these basic and expert definitions, the terms "logistics" and "support" will be used somewhat interchangeably, with the term "support" given the broader connotation, as already suggested in the introduction.

That the U.S. Navy's functions are fundamentally related to land, sea, and air operations the world over is made clear in the Department of Defense Directive of 1958 which lists as a primary U.S. Navy function: ". . . to establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations, to seize and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct such land and air operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign." <sup>5</sup>

In considering the employment of overseas mobile and shore-based support, the official Navy policy must be made clear at the outset:

It is the policy of the Chief of Naval Operations that logistic support of deployed afloat combat forces will be provided, to the maximum extent feasible, by mobile logistic support forces. Overseas base support of such forces will be provided to the degree necessary to supplement mobile support capabilities . . . Active mobile logistic support forces, supplemented as necessary by existing bases and foreign indigenous resources, will be tailored to sustain, for 90 days without augmentation, operations planned or envisioned under emergency cold war conditions, or in limited war . . . In supporting deployed naval forces indigenous resources available in overseas areas should be utilized whenever practicable. The development of alternate sources of supply outside the continental U.S. will provide strategic reserves to assist in countering interruption of supply lines. <sup>6</sup>

**Mobile Logistic Support.** Perhaps Admiral Mahan best defined mobile logistic support, which he called "communications," when he described it as "a general term, designating the lines of movement by which a military body, army or fleet, is kept in living connection with the national power." <sup>7</sup>

Let us look for a moment at the types of mobile support used in the U.S. Navy today, which are collectively termed the Mobile Logistic Support Group. To be used to the maximum extent feasible, they are:

- (1) The Mobile Support Group of ships and movable base units,
- (2) The Underway Replenishment Group of ships and Carrier On-board Delivery (COD) aircraft.
- (3) The Pipeline Group of ships and aircraft. <sup>8</sup>

The Mobile Support Group acts as a kind of naval base afloat in an overseas port or anchorage, while the Underway Replenishment Group, commonly called the URG, ranges the seas, making at-sea transfers of fuel, ammunition, general stores and provisions direct to the combat forces. The URG may draw stocks from the Mobile Support Group in port, or it may be resupplied direct from Pipeline ships plying between the continental United States and the operating areas. Pipeline or long-haul ships resupply both the URG and the Mobile Support Group.<sup>9</sup>

One other military group providing seaborne logistic support must be noted here since, though not a part of the numbered fleets, it provides the greater part of the general pipeline flow to overseas forces and support facilities. This is the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS), "the single agency which provides sea transportation to meet all requirements of the Department of Defense except for that provided by units organic to the operating forces."<sup>10</sup>

**Overseas Shore Support.** For a graphic statement of the need for overseas naval shore support we may turn again to Admiral Mahan:

Having therefore no foreign establishments, either colonial or military, the ships of war of the U.S., in war, will be like land birds, unable to fly from their own shores. To provide resting places for them, where they can coal and repair, would be one of the first duties of a government proposing to itself the development of the power of the nation at sea.<sup>11</sup>

Another sea power strategist has broadened the concept of naval bases to include "all the points in which sea power meets the land, or vice versa; any locality in which the two exchange their resources or affect each other in any way."<sup>12</sup>

In today's technical world, our Navy's list of overseas shore support activities must be broadened still further. There are over 200 separate Navy and Marine Corps activities located overseas at present in some 38 foreign states or territories. They span the world, from such remote spots as the U.S. Naval Facility at Chichi Jima in the Bonin Islands of the Western Pacific to the U.S. Naval Communication Station in Asmara, Ethiopia. In communications alone the Navy has some 34 stations and units sited around the world.<sup>13</sup>

As another indication of the magnitude of U.S. overseas military basing, it was determined several years ago that slightly over one million Americans, including military dependents and civilians, were involved in our military activities overseas, and that the aggregate expenditures for maintenance of these forces and the installations at which they were located were putting more than two billion dollars into the local economies annually.<sup>14</sup>

Wartime basing and stocking overseas can be even more impressive. One of our World War II logistic experts, Vice Admiral Oscar Badger, provides an interesting example of the magnitude of such requirements:

To give you an idea of the problem, we had 6,400,000 big barrels of aviation gasoline underground in England. A tanker carries 2500 barrels. Now that 6,400,000 barrels of aviation gasoline was not an excess allowance. That represented a four months' allowance for the air operation in England. That's all.<sup>15</sup>

A quick calculation shows the above storage of aviation fuel in England to have been the equivalent of over 2,500 tankers filled to the capacity indicated by Admiral Badger. As another example of the immense buildup of support required to wage World War II, the Navy had no adequately equipped advance base in 1940 other than Pearl Harbor. In the period 1940-1945 its Bureau of Yards and Docks built or supervised the building of over 400 advanced bases costing \$2,135,427,881. In one month, June 1945, some 25 million barrels of bulk fuel went to the Pacific alone. At Guam, one million gallons of aviation gasoline were used daily.<sup>16</sup>

**Mobile versus Shore Support.** The question of our overseas sea and shore mix will be looked at more closely. Suffice it to say here that the question does concern military planners and our nation's leaders today. One study conducted commercially for the Department of Defense arrived at the following conclusions as to the effectiveness of U.S. overseas bases:

Within the military region, their [U.S. overseas bases] main value seems to be in performance of logistic support and reconnaissance-intelligence functions. Within the political region, their greatest effectiveness is in support of friendly governments, with only slightly less effectiveness in contributing to alliance cohesion, while they compare generally unfavorably to other types [ships, aircraft, missiles] in their sensitivity to political changes. Economically, the bases are most effective in benefiting foreign countries, less effective in their sensitivity to technological changes, and quite ineffective in benefiting the domestic economy.<sup>17</sup>

Testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in January 1964, Secretary of Defense McNamara expressed the position of the Defense Department with respect to the more particular problem of whether general purpose forces and their equipment should be kept at overseas bases or be home-based:

The quick reaction capability which these forces help to provide can be achieved in a number of ways: by forward deployment of military forces, by the prepositioning of equipment and supplies on land or in ships, and by the deployment of both men and equipment from a central reserve in the U.S.

Each of these alternatives, and the variations of them, has certain advantages and disadvantages. Our present program is based on using a combination of these various methods, but we still have much to learn about the proper balance among them.<sup>18</sup>

To summarize, concepts and facilities to which the U.S. Navy presently looks for overseas support of its missions include the vital Pipeline from the United States, floating bases called Mobile Support Groups, at-sea delivery ships known as Underway Replenishment Groups and including Carrier On-board Delivery by aircraft, and the deployment and forward positioning of personnel and material at a vast complex of advanced bases ashore which provide a myriad of services and vary tremendously in size and scope.

## II—OVERSEAS SUPPORT IN ACTION

Inexorable circumstances made America the champion of free men everywhere, and its armed might the principal guardian of the culture and the liberty of the Western World.<sup>1</sup>

**The Days of Sail.** "The days when fleets lay becalmed are gone, it is true; but gone also are the days when, with four or five months of food and water below, they were ready to follow the enemy to the other side of the world without stopping."<sup>2</sup>

Thus spoke Admiral Mahan, somewhat nostalgically one senses, of a period when the amount of food and drink aboard dictated the time at sea—a dictate which itself could be easily rectified by putting ashore a landing party, if the natives were friendly.

Yet even as early as the War of 1812 Great Britain resorted to overseas naval bases in Canada, Bermuda, and the West Indies. Without them it has been questioned whether she could ever have maintained her effective blockade of young America's East Coast ports.<sup>3</sup> And in our own Civil War, U.S. ships were equipped in northern ports but sustained in the struggle for the south by bases at places like Port Royal, Key West, and Pensacola.<sup>4</sup>

**The Coaling Interlude.** The last half of the 19th century saw steam replace sail and coal become the prime mover of warships. Revolutionary concepts of support and mobility were inevitable. As Bernard Brodie put it: ". . . without fuel, warships cannot move, and without a secure and readily available source of supply they dare not move . . . [They] must submit to the impediments armies have long borne—dependence on a line of communications which must be maintained and defended at all costs."<sup>5</sup>

Great Britain was first to realize the full significance of this revolutionary concept. Admiral Lord Fisher once said of his beloved England that she held the "five keys which lock up the world—Dover, Gibraltar, Alexandria, the Cape of Good Hope, and Singapore."<sup>6</sup>

Coal as a fuel presented problems of no small stature. Consider the plight of one fleet shortly after the turn of the century:

The voyage of the Russian Fleet under Admiral Rojestvensky from the Baltic to the Sea of Japan (13 October 1904 to 27 May 1905) was a voyage during which logistic factors became the pre-dominating influence on strategical and tactical decisions. A logistical decision became a major factor in the Battle of Tsushima, when extra coal considered necessary to reach destination was stowed on deck and so increased the draft as to put armor belts at or below the waterline.<sup>7</sup>

Just three years later our own Great White Fleet sailed around the world in what has been described as a "logistic travelogue." Nearly three-fourths of its coal needs were supplied by foreign sources.<sup>8</sup>

World War I found the world's navies partially converted to fuel oil. But lack of overseas bases was to restrict what might have been an extended war area to Europe and the North Atlantic. Germany's battle fleet served little purpose, and its submarines suffered sorely for want of extra-continental logistic support. And though we ourselves possessed the Philippine Islands, with no naval bases west of Hawaii, Theodore Roosevelt dubbed these islands the "Achilles' heel" of the United States.<sup>9</sup> The Great War's end found the United States itself snugly isolated, with no European or Asiatic power having an adequate foothold in the Western Hemisphere essential for significant hostile operations.<sup>10</sup>

World War II. For the U.S. Navy, the concepts of mobile support and advanced basing came of age simultaneously in World War II. Admiral Nimitz, then Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, has since credited endurance of the Pacific Fifth Fleet to a combination of advanced bases, progressively established closer to fleet operating areas, and to ever-increasing replenishment of the fleet at sea.<sup>11</sup>

In Admiral King's final report as wartime Chief of Naval Operations, he summed up the value of Pacific bases thus:

But for the chain of advanced bases the fleet could not have operated in the western reaches of the Pacific without the necessity for many more ships and planes than it actually had. A base to supply or repair a fleet 5000 miles closer to the enemy multiplies the power which can be maintained constantly against him and greatly lessens the problem of supply and repair.<sup>12</sup>

Advanced bases of World War II were not without their serious problems, however. Depositories for what eventually became an uninterrupted torrent of supplies flowing out of mobilized America, bases were frequently left behind in this fast-moving war. Into such backwash bases would continue to pour deliveries well after operations had shifted—due largely to sheer time lag in pacing logistics to strike operations. Vice Admiral Dyer has

described the U.S. Naval Base at Manus Island, north of New Guinea, as one of the examples of such "logistic snowball." It was our third largest advanced base, exceeded only by Guam and Leyte-Samar. It had airfields, a seaplane base, hospital, POL tank farm, supply depot, a 90,000-ton floating drydock, several other drydocks, and a four-million-gallon daily water system. Yet the war had moved far north to the Marianas and the Philippines before the mountains of supplies and the mounting facilities at Manus Base had even slowed their influx.<sup>13</sup>

One authority on World War II naval logistics has estimated that no more than 50 percent of individual supply requisitions sent out from the United States amidst this torrent of forward-flowing material ever got together with their intended users in time to be effective.<sup>14</sup>

Thus we see during World War II the first really large-scale use of mobile and shore support mutually supporting each other in a combined sea and land campaign. Unfortunately, analysis of their relative effectiveness and respective proportions is virtually swallowed up in the sheer volume of support which flooded the combat theaters during much of that war. It is significant to note, however, that hundreds of shore facilities were essential to simply contain this flood of material. Whether a similar performance could have been approached by dependence instead on thousands more floating bases, assuming their construction in sufficient time, is problematical.

Post-World War II. "So severe were the financial and personnel cut-backs following World War II that the Navy found itself temporarily forced to abandon mobile logistic support as a practice. By default the overseas base once again found itself responsible for providing logistic support to the fleet."<sup>15</sup> Thus has one author described our predicament as the Korean war approached. Fortunately, concepts had not been lost and mobile support ships were relatively available in mothball fleets. The lesson here was that mobile support in some proportion must be kept in being in the active Navy, but that relative costs will probably govern the proportion of mobile-to-shore support under nonwartime conditions. We shall look further at this problem in the chapters ahead.

Meanwhile, the 1950's introduced yet another facet into the many-sided question of overseas support. Could air power take over the logistic supply duties of ships? Or did air power perhaps even negate the need for overseas support entirely?

Arguments flew thick and fast. One most reliable authority was to point out that "86% of all Allied personnel who went to Korea traveled there by ships. Ships carried . . . 99.68% of all cargo transported there. For every ton delivered by air, ships had to provide four tons of aviation fuel."<sup>16</sup>

Alexander de Seversky was to claim in support of air power that "when the Navy claims it can keep the sea lanes open, it is in a



dreamland of the past . . . there would be no point in keeping the sea lanes open." 17 Mr. de Seversky's rebutter had already countered this notion with the plea that "a foothold in Europe must be held, no matter what uncomfortable bedfellows the U.S. must accept into the intimacy of bundling." 18

In point of fact, the United States not only remained in Europe in force, but rimmed all of Eurasia with a net of overseas bases. These bases were to support air, land, and naval forces, while terms such as "balanced force," "flexible response," and "nuclear deterrent" found their way into the Defense vocabulary. As a member of NATO we participated in the "greatest military construction program in the world"—a sprawling complex of naval bases, storage depots, training facilities, warning devices, headquarters areas, and some 220 airfields. 19

Today we are involved in Vietnam. Perhaps the most noteworthy development of the Vietnamese war for the U.S. Navy has been reaffirmation of the need for modern mobile support backed up by shore facilities capable of rapid expansion in an emergency. But modern mobile support, unfortunately, was largely in prototype or design stage. As one naval observer recently put it: "Just as we approached World War II with logistic capabilities predicated upon the type of naval operations experienced in World War I, our logistic concepts and capabilities today reflect very little change from those used to support World War II and Korean operations." 20

The shore facilities were there, to be sure, and have served a vital need. With the Seventh Fleet at sea most of the time and being supplied by mobile service units, bases such as Subic Bay in the Philippines and Yokosuka in Japan have amply demonstrated their vital need. Loss of such shore support complexes would in truth "be considered a serious reversal by the Navy." 21

And once again shore facilities such as Subic Bay and more recently built up facilities in Vietnam—Danang, Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, and others—are accepting mounting floods of men and material.

Thus far we have defined terms and recounted the past. Are there lessons in the logistics of overseas naval support to be learned from this narration? Have we in truth entered each new conflict prepared only for the last one? What are the problems facing us? What might we change today in anticipation of tomorrow?

### **III—PROBLEMS GENERATED**

The U.S. can never again find a relative security based on its own frontiers; we require mid-ocean sentinels, polar lookouts, overseas bases, a global outpost line—and, soon, spatial scouts. 1

Problems in overseas support will be viewed as they focus toward a single question. What pattern of ship and shore facilities is required to provide optimum overseas support for carrying out the Navy's missions and

tasks? Political, strategic, logistic, and economic problems will be considered here.

Political. The snug isolationism of the United States after World War I has been noted. World War II and the cold war which followed have altered this state drastically. Soon the United States had "made herself the center of elaborate alliance systems which committed the nation to the defense of half the land areas of the world . . . . All told, the U.S. by 1960 was committed to the defense of some 45 sovereign nations besides her own territories."<sup>2</sup>

Along with these many commitments went overseas bases—hundreds of them of all size and purpose—individually or jointly used by Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. That these bases had and continue to have political implications there can be no doubt. Charles Hitch and Roland McKean have observed in their important work, *The Economics of National Defense*, that "overseas bases affect in many critical ways, political and economic as well as military, the status of an alliance."<sup>3</sup>

Not all views of this vast complex of U.S. bases have been favorable. Particularly at the time of the Cuban confrontation, voices were heard questioning our place on soils near Eurasia. Writing in *The Nation*, Fred Neal observed:

The fact is—regardless of how we may see our bases—that to establish bases on the border of another state must inevitably be considered a provocative act. Up until now the U.S. has been kept from appreciating the impact of our bases around the Soviet Union primarily by our tendency to see contemporary international politics primarily in strictly black and white terms—a direct conflict between American good and democracy on the one side and Soviet evil and dictatorship on the other.<sup>4</sup>

Still other writers complained that we were building up too great a Fortress America with our vast air defense warning system, and not tying ourselves closely enough to our friends and allies overseas.<sup>5</sup>

Perhaps the surest indication of the value of these overseas bases is to see what the Soviets themselves think of them. The following 1960 statement by Andrei Eremenko in the Moscow *New Times* leaves little doubt:

The Soviet general and complete disarmament plan provides for first stage elimination of means of nuclear delivery with simultaneous liquidation of foreign military bases. Why have these two components of the military potential been singled out? For the simple reason that their elimination is most important, logical and substantiated, both from the political and military standpoint . . . . A world without bases would be a world without tensions . . . . [Their elimination] would normalize relations between countries operating these bases.<sup>6</sup>

It is safe to assume that our rimland bases do indeed have high political value, if one is to judge by Soviet interest in their dissolution. But they also pose political problems. Rising nationalistic influences have frequently canceled our previous good will toward U.S. forces at such installations. This is especially true when it is politically expedient. Also, increasing pressure has been placed on the United States to yield jurisdictional control of its personnel to host countries. Then, too, demands are heard more and more frequently for a voice in the operation and maintenance of bases and equipment, an example being Air Force and Navy bases in Morocco.<sup>7</sup>

In discussing economic aid to underdeveloped nations, one noted U.S. economist points out also that the majority of these host governments are not slow to emphasize the dangers of retaliation to which they expose themselves by entering into agreements to provide base rights for the U.S.<sup>8</sup>

Problems of this sort have no easy solutions. Some which have been suggested are to accept increased participation by host nations in the administration and maintenance of U.S. bases, to keep investments low in anticipation of possible losses, and to reduce tensions by channeling funds so as to benefit local economies in host countries.<sup>9</sup>

Unfortunately, the "political temperature" of the world too frequently plays a strong role in the attitudes of host nations and in their treatment of U.S. forces. As an example, much protest was voiced over our work in progress on space and communication tracking stations in Nigeria and Zanzibar in 1960. The reason? Downing of our U-2 reconnaissance aircraft near Sverdlovsk, Russia.<sup>10</sup>

Former President Eisenhower, in discussing United States reaction to host country animosities, said recently. "In country after country we see our embassies attacked, our flag insulted, our motives impugned." The reactions at military facilities abroad can also be strong, though usually more controllable. His solution? "No matter how weary we Americans may be after 20 years of trying to do our job, the central fact of the cold war is that we cannot safely 'get out'—or even back away from our responsibilities and commitments."<sup>11</sup>

The number of U.S. facilities overseas subject to the vagaries of political mood and personnel incidents which can promote unpopularity is staggering. A report prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense in 1963 stated that there were over 2,000 individual U.S. military installations overseas, the majority being radar warning stations, supply depots, communication posts, and other such relatively small installations.<sup>12</sup>

Putting together this weight of numbers and the many political pitfalls which present themselves in each country where the facilities are located, it is no doubt utopian to think that ideal relations can even be approached. One shrewd team of analysts summed it up well when they concluded that, "All in all, it is probably expecting too much to hope that the American forces stationed abroad will actually increase American popularity in these nations."<sup>13</sup>

**Strategic.** Where political questions leave off and strategic problems begin can itself be debated. One difference may be noted. Nearly all analyses of the strategic value of U.S. overseas support facilities are positive in nature and contain few of the thorny problems we have just considered in the political arena.

Dominant in proposals citing our strategic need for overseas shore bases is the theme that they show the U.S. commitment to its allies, and particularly to host nations, in a firm, tangible way. "They have the effect of openly advertising the direct interest and intentions of the United States in those areas."<sup>14</sup>

The following observation made in 1958 can be equally applied today:

Though [the overseas base] generates friction at many points and creates acute difficulties between the U.S. and the host countries, it remains a major strategic asset. It constitutes the cement in our system of alliances . . . the military presence of the United States has served, and is serving, to strengthen the resolve of many nations to withstand external communist pressures and to deal firmly with internal subversion.<sup>15</sup>

An obvious problem to be considered by a nation possessing such a far-flung network of strategic and logistic bases as the United States is that of vulnerability. Hitch and McKean have cited vulnerability as a definite disadvantage of U.S. bases abroad, noting in particular their higher susceptibility to attack when much closer to the Soviet Union than to the United States.<sup>16</sup> However, this observation was directed toward a large scale as opposed to limited war, and loses much of its weight when considered in the latter light.

Anthony Sokol has considered at length the matter of how our host allies must view U.S. presence on their soil. In his judgment the increased vulnerability cannot validly be weighed against increased security at any one base or in any one nation. Rather, the entire complex of bases, weapon systems, alliances, and material assets must be viewed in combination, as a mutually supporting total force which in aggregate acts as a "convincing warning to any would-be aggressor to dissuade him from embarking on a perilous adventure."<sup>17</sup>

It should be quickly noted in this regard that we, as well as our foreign hosts, enjoy this mutual security of numbers. It is not a one-way street for their benefit alone.

In discussing strategic support problems one cannot ignore the question of response times. At first consideration it might appear that mobile support, particularly air, is the key to rapid response in emergencies. But Vietnam has proven conclusively that bases such as those in Okinawa, Japan, and the Philippines greatly expedite response time to Southeast Asia. We simply could not have moved all forces, material, and equipment 9,000 miles direct

from the United States and produced the quick response which we did, nor can we reasonably anticipate doing so in the near future.

This is not to decry air power or air support in any sense. In a war 9,000 miles away or in one next door, the balance of air power can be vital. But inevitably the value of overseas support bases asserts itself. One analyst, referring to the value of aircraft in strategic positioning of power in the Pacific, put it this way. "[Our aircraft] have one great need; a place to sit down, refuel, take on weapons. This is why our aircraft carriers and stepping-stone bases—Midway, Wake, Guam, Kwajalein, Taiwan, the Philippines—have become vital as never before. A fortress today is not a Rock of Gibraltar but a runway with supplies." 18

Strategically, then, the case for the overseas base would appear to continue positive and strong. A Department of Defense study in this area made the following summary conclusions:

The setting up and continued presence of U.S. military bases can do much to deter and to defend against external aggression, and somewhat less to reduce the effectiveness of internal insurrection. Against external aggression, the presence of U.S. bases, with their dependents, can give tangible evidence of a U.S. commitment that is not easily ignored without risk of U.S. involvement in a major conflict with a nation invading the host to the bases. The bases can also act as forward logistic terminals for the rapid deployment of general purpose forces, if it becomes necessary to fight a limited war. In addition, they can do much to stimulate the local economy of a developing nation by offering employment and indeed a certain amount of vocational training to local nationals. 19

**Logistic.** Thus far in this section we have said little of mobile ship support. This was intended, for, in fact, problems concerning ship-based support are few in the political and strategic areas. Rather, mobile ship support excels by all odds in the realms of overseas politics and strategy.

In the logistics area we are not wanting in problems to consider, however, both ship and shore. Pre-World War I and II lack of logistic readiness has already been noted. Vice Admiral Dyer, in retrospect, termed this lack of logistic readiness just prior to World War II as "perhaps our gravest danger of the moment." 20

Even today in a limited war the lack of logistic means has posed serious stresses. Ashore, crash programs have been necessary in places like Subic Bay to ready facilities which will permit rapid high-volume staging through to Vietnam. And in Vietnam itself, long lines of supply ships queue up in the river south of Saigon, awaiting their turn at limited dockside facilities, while hurry-up construction programs at places like Cam Ranh Bay and Danang ready facilities to handle huge flows of men, equipment, and supplies. Yet even these added port capabilities may not suffice.

As recently as November 1965, Vice Admiral Donaho, Commander Military Sea Transport Service, found it necessary to call an emergency meeting of U.S. shipowners to discuss the shortage of ships for supplying war operations in Vietnam. As of October 1965, 150 ships were in use for this purpose, with about 200 needed by January 1966.<sup>21</sup> And greater material flow demands ever-increasing shore and floating base facilities at the terminal end to accept the flow.

In noting this shortage of shore and floating base facilities, it should also be pointed out that floating bases—ships designed to proceed to a forward area and there dispense their cargoes to other ships or to operating units ashore—have two distinct advantages: (1) by their system of acting as base depots and dispensing material only as needed, they avoid much double cargo handling cost and manpower; and (2) the floating bases may be built in advance, or once built, retained in reserve for the next emergency in which a nation might find itself.

Why does logistic readiness apparently lag behind at each new buildup of hostilities? The reasons can best be discerned in the following statement of the problem and suggested solutions:

Historically, experience has shown that the financial strictures upon logistic forces are relatively more severe than those placed upon combat forces. The limited Fleet Logistic Forces in being must therefore make up in quality what they lack in quantity. They must be capable of adaptation to widely varying tasks at the outset of hostilities; and they must also be capable of absorbing smoothly and without impairment of their other functions, a large increase in numbers of ships, personnel, and facilities. Fleet Logistic Forces must be organized to do these things without a time-consuming and costly reorganization after mobilization.<sup>22</sup>

The official Navy position with respect to mobile support has already been stated, namely, the maximum amount. By extension, is minimum shore support here implied? The following plea would lead us to think so:

Since the beginning of World War II, one of the Navy's primary aims has been to free its striking forces from dependency upon fixed bases. In our concentration upon the problem, not enough thought has been given to increasing the independence of our logistic forces from fixed bases, particularly those on foreign soil.<sup>23</sup>

But the question is not so easily answered as might first be thought. In his already referred to article, Edward Kolcum pointed out that both our Air Force and Navy view any widespread cutback of our overseas bases as an action which would restrict reaction time and complicate greatly the logistic problem.<sup>24</sup>

One such logistic complication would surely concern costs. Could we readily afford to be without ship maintenance and repair points such as Yokosuka, Guam, and Subic Bay in the Pacific, for example? A British analyst considers this question in a penetrating manner, best quoted:

The fleet train can only undertake minor repair jobs; refitting needs a naval dockyard. This means simply that a long-legged navy, operating far from its dockyards with the aid of a fleet train, usually needs twice the number of ships to do the tasks of ships based on a string of overseas bases . . . The U.S. Sixth Fleet rotates to its home bases every six months, which at least doubles the ships needed and perhaps far more than doubles the number of men. Bases, in short, economize in ships and men.<sup>25</sup>

Unnecessarily doubling the required number of ships, and providing the men to man them, would be a staggering cost indeed. Such claim, however, is not borne out when all factors are considered. First, the U.S. Navy schedules its Sixth Fleet deployments in such manner that return of ships to the East Coast for overhaul and repair coincides with personnel rotation to the United States, for morale, school training, and reassignment purposes. It would consider the leaving of ships in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean for double or longer length tours as creative of more problems than would be solved. Second, any additional ships which might be needed to do the job in long-legged fashion are birds in hand should war develop and the inevitable increase in needed ships occur. Strategic fleet requirements in the Atlantic are, in fact, tailored to such premise. Third, any addition of fleet overhaul and repair bases in the European area could not result in elimination or even significant reduction of vital East Coast naval bases. Overall costs to support the missions of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet would therefore rise, not lower, by the addition of such bases.

Here, then, is an excellent example of what will be further emphasized: the mix of mobile fleet support, overseas shore support, and U.S.-based support must be tailored to current needs in a given area. Generalizations will not do. Fleet repair bases such as Subic Bay and Yokosuka in the distant Western Pacific may be geographically necessary, while entirely varied needs may obtain in other oceans.

The critical need for swift military response is voiced ever more frequently today. From purely operational considerations such as speed of nuclear pre-emption or deterrence, thinking in this area has broadened to include closer examination of airlift for rapid deployment of forces and material in limited war. The theory, as in fire fighting, is that each increment of response time saved will lessen proportionately the extent of the emergency to be controlled—and the amount of force and material needed to do the job. In a RAND study for the Department of Defense, Allen Ferguson considered the logistic response time for getting material to Europe and concluded that individual requisitions supplied by ship still take a matter of months to arrive, from the time the request is initiated in Europe.<sup>26</sup>

In contrast, we may recall Operation Big Lift in late 1963, the first mass airlift of an entire division of troops to Europe within a few days.<sup>27</sup> An impressive effort indeed, this was a far cry from the grinding effort needed to move a division to Europe by surface means. Yet, one must recognize that from a logistic viewpoint, any concept of airlifting men *and* their material of



war to any point in the world from U.S. home bases is hopelessly optimistic today or soon. In a purely hit-and-run tactic, yes. Or in a special logistic effort such as the Berlin Airlift, by all means. But not in a sustained effort involving combat forces and their equipment as we think of them for most uses. On the House floor, Representative Chamberlain (Mich.) commented on Operation Big Lift on 20 February 1964. After praising the effort, as well it must be, he nevertheless cautioned: "But Operation Big Lift was made possible because we prepositioned heavy equipment weeks and months in advance, and this equipment was carried in the holds of naval vessels. Operation Big Lift was made possible because we had overflight rights . . . because airfields were ready to receive American aircraft." 28

Rear Admiral Dan V. Gallery contrasts the costs of sea versus air transport:

It is not belittling air power to say that it can never replace sea power as the world's basic means of transportation. It is simply stating one of the economic facts of life. It costs \$36 to send a ton of cargo to England by sea. The air costs may run as high as \$1700 per ton. But the cost in dollars means less than the cost to the world's limited fuel reserves. It takes 80 lbs. of black oil to haul a ton of freight across the Atlantic. It takes two tons of high-test gasoline to do it by air. If it were possible to organize a gigantic airlift capable of handling all our imports we would soon devour the world's whole supply of oil. 29

Relative transportation costs by sea, land, and air have been estimated to fall in the ratio of 1:5:50 respectively. 30 This ratio alone would appear to keep airlift in its present valuable role as a means of quick response to move personnel and material only in specialized situations where speed outweighs cost. In the logistic area, Carrier On-board Delivery of high priority cargoes to ships at sea is but one example.

How does nuclear power relate to the problem of overseas logistics? Admiral Hyman Rickover, father of nuclear propulsion in the Navy, has positive views on the matter. Before a House committee in March 1964, he pointed out that frequent arguments that we don't need the advantages of nuclear propulsion in the Navy "are based on the assumption that logistic support will be as readily available in wartime as it is in peacetime. I believe that this is a fallacious assumption. The logistic support forces are more vulnerable to attack than our striking forces." 31

In this connection it is appropriate to introduce what will be a recurring theme throughout the remainder of this work. It is the simple fact that in flexibility lies the key to sound planning for overseas support of our forces. At the moment the question concerns nuclear propulsion. If it will broaden our logistic base and lessen reliance on underway replenishment or visits to ports in any appreciable degree, and we can afford it, should we not have it?

Logically pursuing the Admiral's view above is the following plea for mobile logistics to supplement the advantages of nuclear propulsion—one might even say, to preclude nullification of these advantages:

Nuclear propulsion affords the opportunity to throw off the shackles of fuel. But there are other shackles that nuclear power will not touch. We have always had them, but compared to fuel they were of secondary importance. Now they come into their own. They can be eliminated by a logistic support system as modern as nuclear power itself. This system must be built at the same time as we build nuclear-powered striking forces. We must not permit the nuclear striking force to overshadow its replenishment force in our thinking . . . These ties—the under-way replenishment ships—are the neglected children of the Navy. They have no appeal and therefore tend to be ignored.<sup>32</sup>

**Economic.** So far we have examined overseas support problems from political, strategic, and logistic points of view. But cost considerations, in essence an extension of the logistic question, have increasingly plagued the Department of Defense and the Navy in seeking out overseas commitments.

Consider the increased complexity of equipment. As just one example, our submarine tenders, when first reassigned to support nuclear-type submarines, had to have their supply load lists doubled in line items to accomplish this complex task.<sup>33</sup> Required fuels for naval operations, once largely comprised of black oil, now run the gamut of jet fuels, gasolines of varied octane, liquid oxygen, and an array of exotic missile propellants.

And what of overseas base facilities? Not only are they costly in sum total, but a 1963 Department of Defense study concluded that the entire base structure of all Services added something like two billion dollars annually to local foreign economies, causing serious drain on our U.S. gold reserves.<sup>34</sup>

The flow of gold problem became so serious in recent years that drastic measures were required in all branches of the government. Secretary McNamara devoted much attention to it in his presentation of the 1964 Defense budget to Congress. On 30 January 1963 he told the House Armed Services Committee:

National security expenditures overseas represent a significant percentage of recent deficits in our balance of payments. In recent years, net U.S. defense expenditures entering the balance of payments have averaged \$2.6 billion per year. Through economies in our own expenditures, and by arranging with our allies for their purchase of additional American equipment and services, we reduced that figure to about \$2.0 billion for 1962, and it is our objective to bring it below the billion dollar mark by 1966.<sup>35</sup>

The program to accomplish such drastic reduction by 1966 must not be thought of as a mass shutdown of bases. Specific means to accomplish the goal were recounted by the Secretary as: (1) voluntary reduction of individual expenditures by military and civilian personnel and their dependents; (2) maximum procurement of supplies and services from the United States, where this would not exceed the cost of foreign equivalents by more than 50 percent; (3) reduction of Military Assistance Program funds to very selective projects; and (4) comprehensive review of the need for each foreign military base and installation.<sup>36</sup>

It should be noted that the second means delineated by the Secretary reduced the flow of gold but increased overall costs. Bases, it must be repeated, are normally cost effective in comparison to accomplishing identical tasks supported solely from a home base. They will, to quote one sea power analyst, "more than pay for themselves in savings in the wear and tear of ships, in storage, speed and ease of cargo handling, and the many other economies they will permit."<sup>37</sup> Meanwhile, the flow of gold problem at present nullifies a portion of this advantage. And unquestionably, the total balance of payments picture will henceforth continue to take into account the effect of overseas bases.

Having dwelt at some length on problems in overseas support, let us look now at what might be done and is being done to meet these problems.

#### IV—FOCUS OF TOMORROW

The unrelenting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting—in the handling and the disposition of troops or ships on the battlefield.<sup>1</sup>

**Developments in Mobile Support.** Logistic lag has been suggested. So also has the accusation been made that only fiscal leftovers dribble into logistic modernization.

Where then do we stand in our capability to sustain modern strike forces at sea? The picture is by no means gloomy. Striking new developments are just now reaching fruition—so much so that one Naval Supply Corps specialist has suggested changing the name of the Underway Replenishment Group to the Combat Logistic Support Force, and the Mobile Support Group to the Mobile Sea Base Force. The most fundamental change in operational concept will be the capability of such Combat Logistic Support Force to travel with the Strike Force or join it in the combat area, in contrast to the usual withdrawal of the Strike Force to safe refueling and replenishment range.<sup>2</sup>

Key ship types to permit this step are the new Combat Support Ship known as the AOE, and the new Combat Stores Ship, the AFS. The USS *Sacramento* (AOE-1) represents the first real breakthrough in underway replenishment since World War II. A combined fleet oiler and ammunition resupply ship, she has a design speed of 26 knots and displaces 50,000 tons, making her the largest

and most powerful auxiliary ever built by the Navy.<sup>3</sup> Carrying 177,000 barrels of fuel oil, 1,500 tons of ammunition, and 500 tons of stores and provisions,<sup>4</sup> she will do at once the tasks of an older AO and AE combined, at combat force speed and at replenishment separation distances up to 200 feet. She carries such innovations as aircraft type refueling probes and improved constant tension transfer rigs.<sup>5</sup>

The prototype Combat Stores Ship *USS Mars* (AFS-1) is just as striking. Also capable of high speeds and with improved transfer equipment, she can simultaneously provide the entire loads of an AKS and an AVS, along with one-half the provisions of an AF.<sup>6</sup>

**Carrier On-board Delivery.** At sea delivery by air is also coming up with two prototypes which are more nearly breakthroughs than simple stages of development. A comparison with the aircraft and helicopters which they will replace is the best evidence of this claim:<sup>7</sup>

MODEL	PAY LOAD	FEATURES
OLD C-1A AIRCRAFT	3,500 LBS.	700 MI. FULL LOAD DELIVERY
NEW C-2A AIRCRAFT	10,000 LBS.	1,300 MI. FULL LOAD DELIVERY LARGE DOOR ACCESS
OLD H-34 HELICOPTER	4,000 LBS.	LIMITED SIZE CARGOES
NEW UH-46 HELICOPTER	8,000 LBS.	GREATLY INCREASED SIZE CARGOES

**Supermarkets.** Supply ships serving our Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and Seventh Fleet in the Far East today have acquired the descriptive name "supermarkets" because of the range of items they stock. They may carry as many as 25,000 types of items and replenish a twenty-ship task group in one daylight period.<sup>8</sup> Prototypes such as the AOE already described will do still better.

Also proposed by some as replenishment ships are the Essex class aircraft carriers presently held in combat reserve. While the cost of converting and outfitting these ships would be high, their potential as replenishment ships would more than offset the cost. A single Essex class carrier in this new role could simultaneously provide large quantities of fuel, ammunition, general provisions, aircraft, and aviation spares. It could provide carrier on-board delivery of replacement aircraft and helicopters, as well as COD cargo service. And it could provide ASW and AAW defense for the Combat Logistic Support Force, of which the converted aircraft carrier would itself also be the key logistic provider.<sup>9</sup>

**Limited War.** The Defense Department is contracting now for two more developments in the area of mobile combat logistics which offer dramatic possibilities for quick response in limited war. One will be seaborne, the other an aircraft.

The seaborne innovation will be known as the FDL, or "fast deployment logistic" ship. With a roll-on, roll-off capability, it will carry thousands of tons of airport and pier construction equipment as well as heavy military hardware. Such items as bulldozers, cranes, lumber, pipe, and cement will be carried for the rapid construction of airfields and bases on short notice—a capability in which we proved weak in Vietnam. Included will be tanks and amphibious vehicles, ammunition and small arms supplies. Teams of engineers, technicians, and a support combat force could move in aboard such a ship, off-load, and construct facilities, all as a self-contained unit.<sup>10</sup>

More dramatic will be the C5A, a mammoth jet-powered aircraft designed to carry up to 600 troops, or tanks and other heavy military equipment, more than six thousand miles at about 550 m.p.h. This aircraft will have a payload up to 250,000 pounds, compared to Russia's Antonov transport, estimated to carry 100,000 pounds. The C5A will not, however, be ready before 1969.<sup>11</sup>

**Shore Support Requirements.** Mobile developments just cited are impressive. Do they negate the need for standing overseas bases? The consensus of opinion is no.

The following excerpts from a 1960 editorial in *Time* magazine highlight the conflicting roles of logistics and strategy in determining a course to follow. The opinion has been amply confirmed by events of the past five years:

The Air Force moved up to the long-legged B-52 jet . . . . The Navy equipped its Sixth and Seventh Fleets with enough tankers and supply ships to operate, if necessary, from home bases . . . . the Polaris submarine can range around the world, and the Air Force ICBM's can be fired 7500 miles from the U.S. to any target in the Soviet Empire . . . . While hardware changed, the case for the base system changed, too. For its own defense the U.S. could, if necessary, now leave its forward outposts and retreat to Fortress America. But for defense of the free world alliance—which in a larger sense is the United States' own best defense—the base system is still an essential and will be for the foreseeable future.<sup>12</sup>

This argument for bases overseas hinges then on alliances for defense. But could we not forego such forward positioning and depend instead on rapid deployment to trouble spots? A Department of Defense study says no, that logistic support of U.S. limited war activities in the underdeveloped areas, where trouble is the most likely to develop, poses extremely serious problems and may be the limiting item.<sup>13</sup> Vietnam support has underscored this conclusion. Okinawa and the Philippines, in particular, have provided irreplaceable logistic strength.

Read Hanson Baldwin's personal observation following a trip to Okinawa, as of November 1965:

Okinawa, which many American military men consider the 'keystone of the Pacific,' has become a keystone of the U.S. war effort in Vietnam. This small island, scene of the final and perhaps bloodiest battle of World War II, is bulging with the stuff of war. Kadena AFB has become in the last two months the busiest overseas air base in the world. The port of Naha is jammed with shipping. Vessels lie outside in the open stead, sometimes for several days, awaiting their turn to unload. Ammunition ships unload day and night at White Beach Pier in Buckner Bay while others wait. The warehouses are full of trucks and amphibious tractors. Wire and fuel drums stand in the open.<sup>14</sup>

The Korean conflict, too, might well have had a less acceptable ending without the logistic support bases on nearby Japan. Only in short or very limited control actions such as in Lebanon or in the Dominican Republic does support by mobile units alone appear practical.

Sheer distance of travel to potential trouble spots of the world must really be experienced to appreciate fully the difference between support from home base and the provision of area support through prepositioning or use of local resources. An example may help. Consider a Navy cruiser with a 12,000 mile fuel range at economical cruise speed. To proceed to and from an area of operation as little as 2,000 miles away will require one-third of its fuel. Allowing also for fuel reserve and some high speed operations in the combat area, the cruiser can plan at best on one-half of its fuel duration as useable for time on station upon arrival.<sup>15</sup>

Now consider the Vietnam area some 9,000 miles from the United States. Here the same cruiser will use three-fourths of its fuel just to get there, and require refueling before it can even commence useful operation. To then refuel it solely on a sea-based tether from the United States becomes an expensive, elaborate business. How much more efficient and less costly to have local support bases into which the warship can slip for refueling from prepositioned stores or from locally provided commercial sources. In the Philippines today, commercial fuel is powering our Navy ships and planes of the Far East in large and increasing quantities. Commercial overseas shore support for both fuel and general supplies is both feasible and practical in limited war.

A time-defying analysis of this question of distance and position, written during World War II but reminiscent of Mahan, is worth repeating here:

Advantage of location is something to be sought for itself in planning systems of bases . . . . Every claim that a new magic weapon, a new long-distance bomber, a super-submarine of extended cruising range, has made unnecessary the acquisition of political and strategic bases overseas should be summarily rejected. All duels of weapons and counter-weapons

tend to reach a point of deadlock. When the deadlock is reached, maintenance of *position* usually is decisive.<sup>16</sup>

But the 1944 dateline of this statement predated the atomic bomb, the ICBM, and the Polaris submarine. Do they negate the argument? This writer thinks not. Rather, it appears that the deadlock has been reached and the maintenance of position does apply.

In focusing on tomorrow's shore support requirements, it is again appropriate to hear the official Department of Defense views in the matter of supplying materials of war for potential actions around the globe. Secretary McNamara has been explicit on this subject also, particularly on the question of moving materials direct from the United States, versus overseas prepositioning. On 29 January 1964 he told the House Armed Services Committee:

One of the major determinants of airlift/sealift requirements is the amount of equipment and supplies which can be feasibly maintained overseas, either in land-based or sea-based depots . . . . A number of studies have been made of the lift that would be required to move and support various size forces under a variety of assumptions. Based on the results of these studies, we now believe that we will require some increase in deployment capability, depending on the amount of prepositioning which proves to be economically and militarily feasible. Prepositioning (particularly of non-air-transportable items) will have to be greatly expanded in any event, but it cannot completely substitute for airlift.<sup>17</sup>

To cite just one complication in analyzing the feasibility and the practicality of airlift/sealift versus overseas prepositioning: cost comparisons must not only consider the overall cost of prepositioning and eventual employment of the material from that point, as against airlift or sealift costs direct from the United States to point of employment, but they must also take into account recoverability and disposal or transfer costs for equipment and consumables which are prepositioned but never employed from that location. The assumptions and comparisons multiply rapidly in such analyses. No complete study of this complex question has as yet been completed.

The tenor of Secretary McNamara's testimony, in any case, appears to be to increase overseas prepositioning to a maximum except for that support which clearly can be sustained through other means. He also makes reference in the January 1964 statement to problems with host countries, and it is to this area of interest which we will now turn.

**Blending of Political and Military Interests.** "What is a political base? It is a fortified independent military establishment created abroad for purposes of political influence—not necessarily for defense—at points that are vital either to potentially friendly or potentially hostile powers."<sup>18</sup>

With this interesting definition we suggest a paradox which shall be examined at some length; one which is growing yearly in importance. Simply

stated it is this: while modern weaponry on the one hand will permit home-based warfare, modern technology on the other hand shrinks our world ever smaller, drawing all nations more closely together. Politically, we are in each other's backyards. Can we ignore this paradox? Not so long as politics is the fuze which sets off a conflagration.

Today, political considerations are increasingly determining the choice of new military installations and the loss of old ones. One need only survey a world map briefly, moreover, to see the countless possibilities to acquire base rights from allies in the thousands of islands dotting the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans, and neighboring seas. Superimpose on this the continental opportunities for agreements with our dozens of allies the world over, and it becomes clear that the question is not whether we can obtain base rights, but rather where we should select sites and how many.

We are not in a seller's market here. Our approach must be one of hard bargaining. We are committed to serve or especially please no one. The cooperation of prospective hosts in arriving at equitable arrangements and in sharing costs and effort should be commensurate with the security and economic advantages they acquire by playing host to the military forces of a powerful ally such as the United States. If they desire more than we feel should be provided, we should bargain or look elsewhere. We will be the more respected and more frequently obtain a stable agreement.

U.S. military strategy in the past has normally been to establish "beachheads" in foreign lands from which to function in isolation and insulation from the affairs of the host nation. The war in Vietnam is dramatically refuting that principle today. One sees news photos of strapping U.S. Marines carrying children from bombed villages and of U.S. platoons securing fields as peasants get out the rice crop. One analyst has flatly stated:

Our hope for maintaining conditions favorable to our presence in Asia depends on our entering into activities and commitments from which we have heretofore held aloof. We must be prepared to share the operation of the bases with the host government, to participate in joint military planning, to designate particular forces for particular defense missions, to encourage local armed forces to assume responsibility for military tasks which fall within their technical and financial capabilities, and to relate these tasks to a coherent plan of local or regional defense.<sup>19</sup>

Just as significantly, the author predicts that, "Even with superlative diplomacy and the utmost good will, we will not succeed everywhere, but will encounter situations that call for fundamental adjustments to political facts."<sup>20</sup>



**Political/Military Cooperation.** What then are some specific means available to our military forces abroad by which to obtain closer and more fruitful relations with current or prospective host nations?

Closer logistic interface is one means. "The closer the member nations of an international organization are united in a common purpose and the closer their combatant forces are committed to act together in time of hostility, the closer must be the coordination of military logistic support."<sup>21</sup> This principle, generally recognized by the military during wartime and during the feverish stages just preceding a war, is too frequently neglected in peacetime. Great alliances such as NATO of necessity employ the principle, but at the host and tenant level it may be incidental. Why?

Part of the answer appears to be the reluctance of large powers such as the United States to become too dependent on other nations and other supply sources. Militarily, we retain the beachhead theory. Paradoxically, we accept the commitment of foreign basing but reject the opportunity to exploit the advantages of mutually supporting logistic cooperation. This is especially puzzling when one considers that the decision to live together in peacetime implies the commitment to fight together if hostilities occur.

Logistic cooperation can be furthered in many ways. Standardized equipment is perhaps the most apparent. Other means are common storage sites for joint use, training and standardization programs in-country, joint harbor and shore facility development, increased local purchasing and local hiring (within balance of payments limitations), and programs to provide host nations obsolescent military equipment excess to U.S. needs and to train with them in its use. The possibilities are endless.

Mutual host-tenant satisfaction is fundamental to political/military cooperation. It has been suggested that "the maximum program of [political and strategic] bases, which looks to political guidance and the prevention of war, the assurance of stability and protection of friendly powers, and the winning of unfriendly powers, should be put into effect only with the harmonious consent of the power concerned."<sup>22</sup> Applied to base rights agreements, this may be translated: don't go into an agreement if it is likely that doing so will lead to discord and squabbling—and get out if it does.

A corollary to this principle of selectivity to ensure harmony must surely be to avoid the position of vitally requiring any single foreign-based installation. Not only does such dependence make the United States unacceptably vulnerable, but it destroys our bargaining position and the option to depart gracefully from a politically untenable situation.

The decision to leave an overseas military facility, whether under friendly or strained political relations, usually involves the turning over of all fixed installations, an action of no small cost to the U.S. Government. While mobility and portability in shore installations is inherently limited, there are some opportunities to be flexible even here. One example presently under observation is the new U.S. Naval Communication Station

in Greece. For the first time a facility of this type was completely packaged in mobile vans and trailers, and then sited so as to permit U.S. military personnel who would operate it to base on the local economy. Here is a package which, if it proved expedient, could apparently be relocated at a fraction of the cost for usual installations.

Across the world is another example of a shore-based installation with potential portability. At Chu Lai in Vietnam, U.S. Marines and Navy Seabees laid a useable jet runway in 23 days, out of interlocking two-by-twelve foot panels of extruded aluminum.<sup>23</sup> Each panel, several inches thick and weighing 144 pounds, forms a rugged box girder which is reuseable in fact as well as theory, unlike the familiar perforated steel matting of World War II.

Other semiportable installations are common, such as the familiar quonset hut and butler building. But much could be done, if attention were given the problem, to effect true portability of entire installations overseas. And portability lends flexibility. Such portability would prove particularly effective when accomplished in conjunction with action to streamline the total overseas infrastructure to minimum essential needs, while simplifying and standardizing construction techniques and equipment used.

It has already been noted that there are over 2,000 U.S. military installations abroad—defining an installation in this case as each separate piece of property performing a particular function. The possibilities here for originality to strengthen political relations are rich. We have all seen or read where military installations in the United States, no longer needed for their original purpose, were used by local public or private organizations for schools, hospitals, youth camps, colleges, churches, public agencies, and so on. Military acquisition, construction, and disposal at the many U.S. facilities abroad could well be deliberately tailored to the eventual needs of the foreign community. We seldom stay forever.

Similarly, joint host-tenant use of facilities where security is not a problem can in many cases be encouraged from the start. Rather than view such action with hesitation or as a last resort, we should make "political hay" of the opportunity. We should welcome working hand in hand with a firm ally. Bases are usually lost not by oversharing but by undersharing and aloofness which makes cooperation and good will impossible. Once such a state arrives, the most powerful and far-flung base is at the mercy of host politicians. We are unlikely to retain it for long.

And finally, the benefits of overseas military purchasing in the fostering of political cooperation and good will should not be overlooked. During peacetime and in limited war, the shot-in-the-arm effect of U.S. military spending on local economies is too often forgotten. By today, economies like Japan and West Germany have little need for the military purchase or the serviceman's dollar. But such purchases were significant in the post-World War II era. And in the turmoil and tragedy of war in the Republic of Vietnam today, the economic modernization of the state is little noted.

But progress is everywhere. The moral here is not that progress and prosperity follow the U.S. military, but rather that where U.S. military forces must be based, local economies may be both used to advantage of the U.S. forces and bolstered simultaneously.

To be sure, politico-military cooperation is by no means totally lacking in U.S. management and planning of overseas installations. The country-team concept, wherein the U.S. ambassador coordinates the activities of representatives of the various U.S. agencies abroad, includes close working relationships with military officials. And at the top level of government, the Secretaries of State and Defense meet regularly in Cabinet and Security Council meetings and in discussions with the President involving U.S. political and military affairs abroad. However, between these in-country and top level echelons there appears to be a large area where politico-military planning and execution of U.S. overseas basing could be strengthened. This seems particularly true in the area of predicting potential troubles and in planning new means and methods to achieve closer working relations with governments hosting U.S. military activities.

**Conservation of Resources.** The Navy must be prepared to do its share in evolving multiuse bases overseas, by combining operations and basing within the U.S. military as well as with other branches of the U.S. Government which have activities abroad. The Department of Defense is encouraging attempts to promote this end, and a great deal more should be heard on the subject. Efficiency and conservation abroad must be constantly improved in an era when cost effectiveness, including balance of payment precautions, has become an important cold war tool.

In a similar vein, conservation must be sought by regular review and updating of defense contingency plans for foreign basing rights. Where appropriate, such plans should permit immediate activation of base rights at the installations of allies in event of emergency. In some instances firm planning of this nature may well negate the need for actual occupation of facilities during peacetime.

**Emerging Nations.** Nearly all U.S. military bases are today located in the Northern Hemisphere. But to the south, independent states are springing up by the score and political action is on the rise. The Indian Ocean is rung by disturbances. Is it likely that emergencies can be limited indefinitely to local skirmishes in these lands down under? The question should interest all of us.

In this thought provoking book, *Politics in Africa*, Herbert Spiro makes the following observation regarding U.S. interests on that continent:

If the U.S. does not move in where its allies of NATO moved out, the Soviet Union inevitably will. 'Moving in' or 'taking over' is thought of in military, economic, and political-constitutional terms. In other words, the argument is, first, that we need to take over the military bases of the departing colonial powers. The West needs these

bases, and if the U.S. fails to replace France or Great Britain, the Soviet Union will do so instead.<sup>24</sup>

These are strong words indeed. Mr. Spiro is quick to add, "We should welcome the waning of the military argument in view of the lack of military traditions in these new political systems."<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless, his original point is all too clear. Power vacuums have a way of filling.

U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean may well be close at hand. In October 1965 it was publicly stated that the U.S. Navy was "currently studying the possibility of erecting a joint base in the Seychelles Islands." For the British this would be one of a series of small island bases in the Indian Ocean which might eventually substitute for such major bases as Aden and Singapore.<sup>26</sup> In November 1965 the Seychelles site, Diego Garcia, was described as a British backup for their larger base at Aden, and as a "transistorized islet" for combined Anglo-American communications, staging, and refueling missions.<sup>27</sup>

One other development could push maritime interests southward. International agreement on standardizing the width of territorial seas at six miles may not be far off. Such action missed being widely adopted as a convention of the sea in 1960 by the narrow margin of a single vote. Widening of the territorial seas, along with unilateral tendencies by some nations to claim large chunks of ocean as inland waters, would greatly increase interest in alternate shipping routes to the south. With such shifts must inevitably come increased interest in southern ports and southern base rights.

## V-CONCLUSIONS

Across the earth from Asia to the heart of Africa forces are loosened whose direction is uncertain and whose portent is full with challenge.<sup>1</sup>

What, then, can be said specifically and with confidence about the future of overseas Navy support planning?

**Availability of Bases.** It is safe to assume that shore support through such mediums as regional and bilateral alliances and base rights agreements will continue to be available in generally sufficient quantity. As to our continuing role as a maritime power needing basing rights overseas, the distinguished strategic analyst, George Fielding Eliot, has made this flat prediction:

In summation, it is assumed with confidence, even with assurance, that the political and strategic environment of the year 1973 will be dominated by a maritime coalition of industrial democracies under the leadership of the United States, in association with an integrated Western Europe, and that the global dominance of the alliance will be based on control of the oceans of the world.<sup>2</sup>

**Shore Basing Concept.** Shore basing remains a sound concept as one means of overseas support, whether considered from political, strategic, logistic, or purely economic considerations. A preponderance of both military and nonmilitary views stand behind this opinion. A number have already been cited in the foregoing chapters, including official Department of Defense expressions. Studying U.S. military views alone, one civilian analyst concluded that "Air Force, Navy, and Army all maintain that any mass closing of foreign bases would cripple the existing capability to contain local war and permit Communist forces to fill the resulting military vacuum."<sup>3</sup> Expanding on the theme of local wars along the Eurasian rimland, he concludes:

Debate on the validity of foreign bases has forced the Services to review alternatives. Defense planners have concluded that collective security alliances, with base rights, remain the best defense against Communist bloc expansion. They also feel that the present forward base strategy is strategically sound as long as there is a threat of local war involving allied nations along the Communist bloc periphery which are not strong enough to meet the threat alone.<sup>4</sup>

Expressed in political terms, another analyst has noted that we must retain advantageous forward positions overseas if we are to hold a favorable balance of power in particular regions.<sup>5</sup> He also refers in this instance to the Eurasian rimland.

Anthony Sokol has taken one of the most sweeping views of the concept of overseas shore support. Embracing at once political, strategic, and logistic considerations, he arrives at these conclusions:

But it is obvious that this system of bases [around Eurasia], at least as far as seapower is concerned, does not necessarily consist of a chain of fortified islands—the image of advanced naval bases that comes to the minds of most people—but that every port and harbor along the Eurasian continent represents a potential base and a springboard, to which we project the power originating on the American mainland, and from which we send it out again toward the intended target areas. This system of bases includes not only Iceland or Okinawa, but also London, Cherbourg, North Africa, or Seoul, and many others, plus whatever additional locations become necessary in case of war. If viewed in this comprehensive manner, bases are obviously as necessary today as they ever were; neither the development of mobile fleet support nor the greatly increased vulnerability of fixed positions can change or abrogate that need.<sup>6</sup>

**Primacy of Mobile Support.** From the Navy standpoint, overseas shore support must always be viewed as an adjunct to, not a replacement for, mobile support. In dealing principally with the pros and cons of shore

support, this point has perhaps been insufficiently underscored. In no way can naval forces derive so much flexibility of support as through fast, multi-purpose, logistic vessels, supplemented by air delivery of priority cargoes. As a corollary to this prime conclusion, it must be repeated that insufficient attention has been given in the past to modernizing logistic resupply ships and mobile resupply techniques. On both counts, the more dramatic strike forces and their equipage too often overshadow logistic modernization, resulting in logistic lag. Grim warning is sounded: "Until we bring our logistic concepts into focus with the realities of the potential conflict situations of today and attempt to project them into future situations, our combat forces will continue to operate on a logistic tether which is likely to remain unseen until it pulls taut in some future conflict."<sup>7</sup>

**Political Significance.** Military planners, Navy included, must increasingly recognize the close political/military relationships in overseas basing. And just so must the politicians see this meeting of interests:

Clearly the greatly increased role of the military can be explained in good part by the crucial importance of the military equation in international politics. It is also clear that this dependence of American foreign policy on military strength has major consequences for the military as well as for the makers of foreign policy. As far as national security is concerned, military and non-military factors are so closely interrelated that they may be thought of as inseparable aspects of particular problems and situations.<sup>8</sup>

Ways in which overseas military bases can be used to concurrently strengthen political ties are several. Joint ventures between host and tenant should be encouraged where security will permit. Bases should be planned with current and future needs of the host country clearly in mind, so that friendships may grow. Even more emphasis should be placed on military personnel training and adaptation for foreign shore duty and visits abroad. The country-team concept should increasingly blend U.S. political and military planning and execution at the in-country level. Local overseas purchasing of goods and services must be recognized as a form of assistance, and correlated with political interests.

Foreign basing must be sufficiently flexible and diffused so that installations can be given up rapidly and in a spirit of good will when in the best interests of the United States. Sufficient overseas support capability, mobile and fixed, must be kept available so that all dealings with foreign governments can be made from a position of strength and mutual respect rather than under pressure.

In sum, each foreign basing venture must be looked upon as a joining of forces against a common threat. "We're in this together" should be the byword. Attitudes must be recognized as being fully as decisive to continued success as force or wealth. For those who worry about the dependency engendered by falling in too closely with overseas hosts, it must be realized once and for all that in today's shrinking world, we *are*

dependent. The term "interdependent," however, more closely describes our mutual needs with friendly nations.

**Flexibility the Key.** Flexibility must be recognized as the key to balanced overseas support. No formula can be set by which the proper blend of ship and shore support can automatically be metered. But flexibility will permit trial while lessening the seriousness of error. How then can flexibility of support be attained?

**By alternate options.** It has been said that "the hallmark of current policy is flexibility in dealing with local imitations over bases—thanks to extra margin of safety in the long reach of home-based weapons."<sup>9</sup> But options must also be possible within the overseas base structure itself, through proper siting and employment.

**By rapidity of deployment.** Use of overseas support bases need not be thought of solely in terms of permanent, preestablished sites. Rather, fast deployment techniques, and the ability to conduct operations from quickly erected skeleton facilities concurrent with their further development, will permit correspondingly fewer standing installations. As part of such techniques, planning must see to the training of personnel able to quickly erect, operate, and support these new-style advanced base facilities. And organizational and operational plans must embrace the entire concept.

**By sufficient mobility.** Rear Admiral Eccles once observed that "flexibility and mobility are closely related and that each is essential to the development of the other."<sup>10</sup> A strong and versatile mobile support force will add tremendously to the potential for flexibility in support ashore.

**By cost analysis.** There will be times when cost effectiveness dictates the degree of emphasis to be placed on mobile support or on shore-based support. As an example, extension of significant U.S. naval operations throughout the Indian Ocean area might not be cost effectively supported by mobile forces alone. Bases such as that being planned for the Seychelles might prove highly cost effective at such extended ranges of operation. In other circumstances (for example, where the political climate portends problems ashore) mobile support alone might prove less costly in the long run.

**By proper mixing.** General Wheeler testified before the House Armed Services Committee in 1964 that "militarily no one can deny that you must have a proper mix of mobility and forward deployment. The hard thing to do is to sort out what the proper mix is, particularly in view of political commitment, psychological factors, and so on."<sup>11</sup> Clearly implied here is the need for continuing review of our overseas support needs by the responsible military and civilian planners.

**By the good judgment of men. It is on this note that we will close. In the final analysis, one man must each time make a final judgment, right or wrong. Knowledge of the facts, experience, and dedication to right are his resources with which to make that judgment. Flexibility both eases the task and strengthens the decision.**



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#### BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Captain Warren A. Skon, U.S. Navy, is a naval aviator. He was educated at the University of Minnesota, General Line School, and the University of Maryland. He holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Social Science from the George Washington University.

Captain Skon has served as a pilot on various attack carriers; he was CIC Officer on the USS Norton Sound (AVM-1), Executive Officer at NAAS Kingsville, Commanding Officer at NAS Moffett Field, and he served in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Captain Skon graduated from the School of Naval Warfare at the Naval War College in 1966 and is presently serving at the Defense Communications Agency, Navy Service Center, in Washington, D.C.



## *Correspondence Courses in Perspective*

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to broaden my professional knowledge, to learn new approaches and different procedures for similar problems to those in the Army. But in actual fact I think the real reason is that these courses are a true intellectual challenge. They are not easy, at least for a man in his forties who has no naval background or experience. They require a real and sustained effort, more so than I recall even in my university years. This mental exercise may make me a bit snappish toward my wife when she intrudes into my office in the evenings, but it sharpens the mind as no amount of even serious reading can do . . . the most valuable portion of your courses is the thoughtful comments, often at considerable length, that are returned with my solutions. I rather suspect that several officers have spent some exasperated hours in explaining to me what every j.g. should know as a matter of course.

A Commander, U.S. Navy, upon completion of the second installment of the course in *Military Planning*:

Although I have done similar work at General Line School and at the Armed Forces Staff College, and have been an "action officer" in the Joint Plans Section of the Atlantic Command, I consider this course a valuable addition to my education as a naval officer. I can add my recommendation to all the others that this course be widely advertised as one of the best.

A Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve, who has completed the course in *Strategic Planning*:


Although parts of it infuriated me and caused much flinging of texts, completing the four parts gave me an understandable concept of the high-level planning involved in Navy structure. As a correspondence course, it was ideal; it never insulted my intelligence; it always stimulated me.

A Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy, referring to the course in *National and International Security Organization*:

This course has increased my knowledge of national and international organization one hundredfold. It has aroused my curiosity and desire to read and learn more about other national organizations. I have become aware of the myriad problems involved in establishing and maintaining a workable organization.

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The President of the Naval War College extends the benefits of the College to nonresident military officers and selected government employees by offering appropriate correspondence courses. These courses are constantly reviewed and updated to keep them in consonance with the resident courses.

Naval War College correspondence courses are available to all officers of the United States military services and the Coast Guard of the grade of Navy Lieutenant (or equivalent) and above in active service or in the inactive reserve. Selected government employees of the grade GS-10 (or equivalent) and above may enroll in these courses, also. The waiver of rank or grade may be granted for qualified individuals in lower grades. Applications from active duty officers should be by letter via Commanding Officer or by the enrollment card provided in this issue of the *Review*. Applications from inactive duty officers should be by letter via Commandant, Naval District, or command maintaining record.

Effective 1 August 1966, the Chief of Naval Personnel approved an increase in Naval Reserve retirement-point evaluations of Naval War College correspondence courses. The description of courses which follows reflects the increased retirement-point evaluations. With the new evaluations, all of which are over 12 points per installment, the satisfactory completion of each installment will be creditable instead of each two-installment unit.

**NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION, NWC 14.**  
2 Installments—28 Points total—14 Points per installment.

A study of the National Security Council; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Office of the Secretary of Defense; Headquarters of the Military Departments; Unified, Joint, and Combined Organizations; International Security Organizations; and Foreign Aid Programs.

**COMMAND LOGISTICS, NWC 15.** 3 Installments—39 Points total—13 Points per installment.

A study of basic logistic considerations, logistic elements and functions; interrelationships of strategy, tactics, and the basic elements and functions of logistics; the impact of future developments and trends of warfare upon the field of logistics; and the impact of future developments in the field of logistics upon the concept of warfare from the command viewpoint.

**INTERNATIONAL LAW, NWC 16.** 6 Installments—102 Points total—17 Points per installment.

This course is designed to provide the student with the means to gain an understanding of principles of international law having to do with the organization of the world community with emphasis on areas of naval interest and with specific application of these principles to the Naval Officer's profession.

**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NWC 17.** 6 Installments—96 Points total—16 Points per installment.

This course is designed to provide the student with the means to gain an understanding of the fundamental elements and basic principles of international relations and the relationship of these elements and principles to the formulation of national strategy.

**MILITARY PLANNING, NWC 18.** 2 Installments—30 Points total—15 Points per installment.

A study of the systematic techniques of logical analysis as applied to military planning using a problem situation; and an introduction to staff organization, functions, staff studies and planning directives.

**NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWC 19. 2 Installments—34 Points total—17 Points per installment.**

A course comprising a study of the characteristics of four major weapons systems and considerations for their employment: submarine, antisubmarine, attack carrier, and amphibious forces. The student need select and complete only two of the four installments; however, a combination of the submarine and antisubmarine installments may not be selected.

**STRATEGIC PLANNING, NWC 20. 2 Installments—44 Points total—22 Points per installment.**

A National Security Council level study of national objectives, interests, and policies, and their relation to national strategy; Soviet interests, objectives, and likely courses of action; strategic planning at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and strategic considerations at a Unified/Specified Command level.

**COUNTERINSURGENCY, NWC 21. 4 Installments—60 Points total—15 Points per installment.**

To provide a means for the student to prepare himself for positions of responsibility which involve the planning and conduct of counterinsurgency programs and to acquire an understanding of the possible contributions of all governmental departments and the need to integrate their available capabilities into effective programs to attain our national objectives.

\* \* \* \*


Successful completion of individual courses is recognized by the award of a certificate and the issuance of a letter of completion. Notification of successful course completion is forwarded to the Chief of Naval Personnel, or other appropriate authority, for inclusion in the student's selection jacket.

The President of the Naval War College will award diplomas to those students completing selected groups of correspondence courses which closely parallel the studies offered at the resident schools of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Warfare. These diplomas certify that the designee is a graduate of the Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff or the Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare.

*The Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff.* Graduation from this course indicates successful completion of four correspondence courses: National and International Security Organization, Military Planning, Naval Operations, and Command Logistics.

*The Correspondence Course of Naval Warfare.* Graduation from this course indicates successful completion of the four courses required for the Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff plus four additional courses: Counterinsurgency, Strategic Planning, International Relations, and International Law.





## **BLOCKADE: EVOLUTION AND EXPECTATION**

A Research Paper written by  
Lieutenant Commander James F. McNulty, U.S. Navy  
School of Naval Command and Staff, 1966

### **INTRODUCTION**

The principles of modern international law recognize the doctrine of blockade as a legitimate option between states in a declared state of war, giving them the right to apply naval power to stop all seaborne commerce with the enemy, including that carried in neutral ships. However, the "legality" of this instrument for exercising national power is a very tenuous matter in the minds of jurists, being circumscribed by a number of significant preconditions, the absence or violation of any of which may void the blockader's claim to legitimate right, and expose him to heated controversy.

The fundamental concept of maritime blockade is an ancient one, and, in its essence, it seems to be fully in harmony with the realities of national existence even in a modern world. However, it is the purpose of

this paper to suggest that the precise technical conditions surrounding the modern instrument of blockade have overlaid this fundamental concept with elements which have divorced the doctrine from reality.

The modern doctrine of blockade and the associated principles of contraband have evolved over centuries, remaining basically constant in the principles invoked but continuously changing as to structural details. Thus, there appears to be a sound basis for considering that the current "legal" definition of the terms and concept of blockade is but the most recent step of an evolutionary process which has not yet arrived at logical maturity.

That the process might shortly be required to respond once more to the stress of international conflict seems apparent. With few exceptions, those modern states having pretensions of becoming international make-weights have sought to establish for themselves a claim to a share in the wealth and prestige resultant from international carrying trade. Even the Soviet Union, long a formidable land power, has begun to make its presence felt in the great competitive arena formed by the world's oceans. Compounding the commercial threat of this seaward expansion by the Soviets, the United States, is faced as well with her sponsorship of militant world communism through the new medium of "wars of liberation." It seems superfluous to state that the United States today finds itself in a position analogous to that of insular Britain in the face of Napoleon—a power dependent on sea communication with its allies, its sources of crucial materials, and its markets, opposed by a dedicated and ingenious enemy having central lines of communication. To confine that threat to the limits of continental Europe was the aim of Britain's effort in the 18th and 19th centuries, while the aim of the United States today must also be to contain the Communist threat within the limits of its existing sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and Asia.

Britain's success against Napoleon was gained largely through her intelligent application of all the devices of seapower available to her, including that of blockade—not a blockade according to rules made by scholars and law clerks, but one governed by rules born of the dictates of necessity and the talents of seamen—a viable doctrine, responsive less to the protests of diplomats than to the realities of the threat to be overcome.

This paper proposes to review in detail the evolutionary process to which the concept of maritime blockade has been subjected in order to point out the historic facility by which nations yield up principle in favor of political reality. Further, it is intended to illustrate that the doctrine of blockade is merely part of a larger scheme which is appropriate for application as an instrument of national power in the complex international society of the current century.

It will not be advocated that the "rule of law" so treasured by our Western society be overthrown in a quest for temporary advantage. It is

hoped merely to articulate what is believed to be an existing ground swell of legal and lay opinion that "laws and institutions are constantly tending to gravitate. Like clocks, they must be occasionally cleansed, and wound up, and set to true time." <sup>1</sup>

## I—FOUNDATION OF THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF BLOCKADE

In ancient times, conflicts between rulers of tribes or the early city-states usually resulted in the involvement of all political entities adjacent to associated military operations. Belligerents, as the active participants became known, always attempted to convert nonparticipants into allies; failing in that, it was expected that action could be taken to at least insure that the opposition would not receive the assistance of bystanders. Such action normally resulted in some form of operations against the commerce of the neutrals, as they later came to be known, and such interference was justified on political rather than legal grounds, if indeed it were thought necessary to justify it at all. <sup>1</sup> In those early centuries of human violence, the "style" of warfare was usually that of the siege against the strong points of an enemy rather than general campaigns throughout the countryside. Under such circumstances, little need existed among states to formulate any sort of legal basis for regulating the trade of neutrals with all belligerents, since it was clearly unprofitable for an apolitical neutral to attempt to continue trade with a besieged point when a ready market for his goods existed among the besiegers. On the other hand, neutrals were normally required to continue trade with any accessible belligerent, since "the discontinuance by a neutral of intercourse with either belligerent, where not an effect of the operations taking place . . . seemed . . . so plain a form of alliance with or subservience to, the other . . ." <sup>2</sup> that it was clearly a political act rather than one arguable as a matter of law.

Before it was possible to contemplate legal justification for the continuance or suspension of commerce with a belligerent by a neutral, it was first necessary for the concept of neutrality to become in "some form a recognized institution of the law of nations, and until the freedom of neutral commerce was in some form guaranteed." <sup>3</sup> This status of authorized impartiality of third states while war raged between others was not formalized and incorporated into the law of nations as the institution of neutrality until the 16th century. <sup>4</sup> Until that time, the principle of land warfare which forbade all forms of intercourse with besieged places governed. Toward the later portion of the period the growth of international commerce intensified the belief that partial neutrality was unjust, and rules aimed at formalizing the limits of a "just neutrality" began to evolve. The earliest of these rules ended the total interdiction of neutral commerce with besieged places but enjoined neutrals from transporting into such places either armed troops or specified materials which would tend to mitigate the effects of the siege. <sup>5</sup> One author points out that this relaxation was more significant as the establishment of a principle rather than any meaningful authorization to trade, "since places so circumscribed would be very unlikely markets to seek with articles not of some immediate utility to the defense." <sup>6</sup>

Thus, by the 16th century, at least some elementary rules regulating neutral commerce with respect to belligerents existed, although they were derived principally from the experiences of land warfare. It was at this time that the unilateral action of one state, Holland, introduced into the growing stream of international law a new principle, based in part on older precedent. The principle was that of blockade, whereby a belligerent has come to be entitled as a matter of law to cut off the free access of neutral commerce to the ports or coast of an enemy.<sup>7</sup>

In 1584, while at war with the Spanish Netherlands, the Dutch Government issued a proclamation (*placaat*) declaring that all Flanders ports then in the hands of Spain were under siege *from the sea*, and that no commerce would be allowed entry.<sup>8</sup> This pretension was based on the ancient right of a besieger to prevent by all means available the crossing of a line of investment by a neutral and the fact that the Dutch naval forces had considerable power to enforce the declaration on neutrals seeking entry. Significantly, no effort was made to invest these ports with land forces at the same time, although it was clearly the Dutch intention "to use the right of siege on an unprecedented scale."<sup>9</sup>

The concept of the maritime blockade thus was established at the end of the 16th century, but before any sense of legality could be attached to it, it was necessary for the publicists to begin the process of formalizing the institution by incorporating it into the growing body of writings which we have come to know as the law of nations. The most renowned of the early publicists, Grotius, writing in 1624, obliquely mentions the justification for the closure of ports as distinct from the idea of concurrent siege by land forces in the following terms:

For if I cannot defend myself without intercepting what is sent, necessity . . . will give me the right to intercept it . . . If the introduction of the supplies impeded me in the pursuit of my right, and this was open to the knowledge of the person who introduced them, as if I was [sic] *keeping a town invested, or ports closed*, and a surrender or peace was already looked for, he will be bound to repay me for the damage occasioned by his fault . . .<sup>10</sup> (Emphasis added.)

This early articulation by Grotius is significant for several reasons. First, by the use of the words "keeping a town invested, or ports closed," he seems to imply that he was considering two distinct concepts, one of siege in the traditional sense, and the other of blockade in the more modern sense, although he fails to use the word "blockade."<sup>11</sup> Secondly, the use of the phrase, "and a surrender or peace was already looked for," has been interpreted as indicating an essential difference between actual blockades backed up by real naval strength as opposed to fictitious blockades laid on only by *placaat*.<sup>12</sup> It is exactly this point of actual versus "paper" blockades that later became so controversial in the evolution of neutral rights at sea, and it is noteworthy to see that this issue was anticipated in the earliest days of the institution. Finally, the

statement actually prohibits all commerce with besieged places, since, as noted above, such places would have little interest in goods not helpful in some way to the defense, and all such goods were historically prohibited.

In 1680, with Grotius' formulation only five years old, the Dutch once more desired to apply naval pressure on Flanders, but by this date had not the means to apply this new form of siege to all ports at the same time. Questioning the applicability of blockade under these conditions, and fearing to antagonize the now-neutral England, the Admiralty of Amsterdam was queried for its opinion. The analysis given was summed up by a jurist writing in a later century, and was to the effect that "the rule which obtains in the case of towns, which are properly said to be besieged . . . extends also to the enemy's ports, which when invested by ships, are said to be besieged."<sup>13</sup> Accordingly, the States General announced in a *placaat* dated 9 July 1680, that the Flanders coast was blockaded and that neutral ships found at any distance from Flanders intending to call at those ports would be confiscated. Further, the *placaat* went on to state that ships which succeeded in passing the blockade into Flanders ports would remain subject to confiscation wherever intercepted on the outward voyage.<sup>14</sup> Here, then, is the source document of the modern institution of blockade—all commerce to be cut off, without regard to its status as contraband, with the further claim to vast powers over neutral commerce far removed from the actual place of investment. This pretentious claim by the Dutch did not remain unchallenged, of course. Although the blockade thus established did not last very long and no records are available as to its results, the swift development of a body of treaties between Holland and various countries beginning with the French in 1646 (all of which rejected the broad principles of the 1630 *placaat*) indicates vigorous neutral diplomatic activity to secure their trade with belligerents.<sup>15</sup> Such activity continues even today.

As the proponents of the institution of blockade, the Dutch continued to figure prominently in its development so long as they remained a significant seapower. Their stewardship of the institution during this era has been characterized by the English jurist Westlake as having been "marked by the widest renunciation of the right to interfere with neutral commerce, the widest actual interference with it when opportunity offered, and the absolute refusal to recognize [the right to] a similar interference with it by others."<sup>16</sup> The Dutch did not remain alone for long, as the changing realities of European power soon brought the rising seapower of England into partnership with them in proclaiming a blockade "of France and all French possessions" after 1689. In this proclamation, both states resurrected completely the spirit of the 1630 Dutch *placaat* by asserting the intention of capturing ships bound for French ports wherever found.<sup>17</sup> This first appearance of England as a blockading power should be marked as some sort of milestone since she continued to occupy that role almost perpetually afterward, rapidly assuming from Dutch hands the responsibility for enforcing and enlarging the doctrine. Additionally, Westlake claims that this event is the probable source of the basis for all English (and consequently American) Prize Law, which, according to repeated Admiralty and U.S. Supreme Court decisions, has been derived from "the received law of nations": i.e., the *placaat* of 1630.<sup>18</sup>

The British, however, did not vacillate in their application of this new doctrine as had the Dutch. They claimed the right to interdict completely neutral commerce bound for their opponents and in the years immediately following established the British "doctrine of war that, no matter by whom carried, goods for an enemy or belonging to an enemy could legitimately be taken." 19 From this date onward, the history of blockade is largely the history of England and her rise to maritime greatness. When Britannia ruled the waves, one of the most efficient tools of her leadership was the blockade.

## II—BRITISH SEAPOWERS AND BLOCKADE

Throughout the 18th century, Europe was in an almost constant state of war, with Britain sometimes a belligerent, sometimes neutral, and sometimes cast in both roles simultaneously.<sup>1</sup> During the period, the crucible of frequent and intensifying war not only permitted the forging of a refined instrument of blockade but forced as well the advancement of naval technology at an accelerated pace. In 1700, fleets generally duplicated the practice of land armies in retiring to winter quarters, leaving only a small force to patrol vital areas. By 1800, large squadrons were able to be constantly at sea, exercising dominion over vast areas of the ocean surfaces by virtue of their presence. Such increased activity "made far more rigorous and oppressive" those British assertions over control of neutral commerce made in earlier years.<sup>2</sup> The growing presence of the Royal Navy at sea was met by ever more vociferous, but generally ineffective, resistance on the part of maritime neutrals toward interference with their claimed rights to trade with any country with which they were at peace.

The turbulence of the age was capped by the cataclysmic struggle against the French Revolution and Napoleon. A passage by Mahan best describes the situation as it affected neutral states:

In the effort to bring under the yoke of their own policy the commerce of the whole world, the two chief contestants, France and Great Britain, swayed back and forth in deadly grapple over the vast arena, trampling underfoot the rights and interests of the weaker parties; who, whether as neutrals, or as subjects of friendly or allied powers, looked helplessly on, and found that in this great struggle for self-preservation, neither outcries, nor threats, nor despairing submission, availed to lessen the pressure that was gradually crushing out both hope and life.<sup>3</sup>

British practice was especially onerous, as she clung to her contention that blockades were enforceable by far-ranging isolated cruisers, and she frequently declared blockades backed by just sufficient naval force as to permit the barest claim to efficiency. But the real basis of neutral complaint against England was the belief that the British use of the blockade often had the aim, not to deprive an enemy of goods, but to secure for Englishmen the trade thus barred to neutrals. The suspicion appears justified in the light of an observation by Lord Grenville in a letter of 18 February 1806, in which he says:

We have a right to prevent that [trade] which is injurious to us, and may, if we think right, in cases where we think the advantage to ourselves compensates or overbalances the injury; a principle manifest in the case of a siege, where we exclude all the world from intercourse with the town besieged, but carry it on ourselves, whenever we think it beneficial to our interests to do so.<sup>4</sup>

In response to this so-called British system, "the continental powers began to aim only at establishing some rule which should prevent ineffective, and therefore . . . inequitable, blockades."<sup>5</sup> These continental powers advocated another interpretation of the blockade principle which was drawn from their own experience as maritime states more often cast in the role of neutrals rather than belligerents. In their view, blockades could only be legitimate "if there be manifest danger in entering the blockaded port, from the cannon either of ships, stationary and sufficiently near one another, or of works on land."<sup>6</sup> That is, they claimed that the right of the blockading power to interdict noncontraband neutral commerce derived solely from the blockader's ability to control the sea immediately off the port in the same sense that a besieging army could command the land approaches to a town.<sup>7</sup>

Countering this claim, the British insisted that the legality of a blockade was proven if the blockader could "maintain such a force as would be of itself sufficient to enforce the blockade."<sup>8</sup> Additionally, Britain refused to accept any limitation on the geographic placement of the blockading forces or of their numbers. The real danger needed to make a blockade effective, and thus legal, she asserted, could be posed by numbers of individual cruising warships even at great distances from the blockaded coast; and that such cruisers, in keeping with the practice of Holland in earlier years, could capture, lawfully even *intended* violators of the blockade. The British position, thus, was identical to that of the Dutch at the time of the 1630 *placaat*, and, as the Mahan quote above indicates, no power or plea could move them from it in the face of the threat from France.

At the same time, however, it was realized in Britain that the maritime balance of the world had begun to shift from European waters, for "a new power had now arisen on the western shore of the Atlantic, whose position, and maritime spirit, were calculated to give new and vast importance to every question of neutral rights."<sup>9</sup> The early British appreciation of deep American interest in affairs concerning maritime neutral rights was predicated on the announced aims of the newborn Republic from the earliest days of independence.<sup>10</sup> Even the earliest American diplomacy attempted to deal with all aspects of maritime commercial freedom in order to secure for her private traders and national good the benefits of international commerce, but the basic American view of blockade is best represented in the instructions given to the American Minister in London in 1804, which said, in part:

In order to determine what characterizes a blockaded port, that denomination is given only . . . where there is by the disposition of . . . ships stationary or sufficiently near an evident danger in entering.<sup>11</sup>

The fictitious blockades proclaimed by Great Britain, and made the pretext for violating the commerce of neutral nations, has been one of the greatest abuses ever committed on the high seas. . . . The whole scene was a perfect mockery, in which fact was sacrificed to form, and right to power and plunder.<sup>12</sup>

What had been a controversy between Britain and the continental neutrals was now joined by a parallel, but independent, controversy between Britain and America; yet, British determination to uphold her position "became a cornerstone of national policy," and "was considered of such importance in 1812 that . . . we considered the disadvantages of having the United States added to our enemies less than those that would follow from a modification of our code."<sup>13</sup> This intransigence had its expected result when President Madison "made clear that 'mock blockades' were one of the principal causes of the war " which opened in 1812.<sup>14</sup>

Neither the European settlement at Vienna in 1815 nor the Treaty of Ghent between Britain and the United States late in the preceding year resolved the issues of neutral rights so hotly contested through the previous 25 years. It remained for the next major European war to bring about the conditions under which some degree of reconciliation between the opposing views could be attained. In 1854, the perpetual enemies, continental France and insular Britain, were allies in the Crimean War which opened in that year. If they were to be effective in the joint application of their seapower, it was recognized that some compromise be struck on their policies toward neutral rights at sea, and a temporary agreement was reached. At the Congress of Paris in 1856, this compromise was enacted into a joint convention among the states present and was promulgated as the Declaration of Paris, in which all maritime powers were invited to join.<sup>15</sup>

The Declaration of Paris represented the first codification of the rules of maritime war which was generally accepted among maritime states. The Declaration consisted of four points of agreement among the powers, of which the first abolished privateering, and the fourth declared the principle that:

Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.<sup>16</sup>

Even this enunciation fell far short of complete reconciliation of the differences of the powers, as the language apparently was left deliberately obscure and ambiguous. Britain remained free to interpret "force sufficient really to prevent access" as she might see her interests at the moment. In retrospect, it is clear that the Declaration simply codified the pragmatic essence of recent experience, and is significant less for its content than for the fact that *any*



agreement was possible among the self-seeking states which authored it. It is significant to point out that it was historic British policy and seapower after 1689 which essentially fixed both the form and scope of the Declaration, since the principles set forward either conformed directly with those policies or were generated by the erosion of certain facets of them by decades of neutral resistance.

The broad theoretical claims of British blockade policy over those years was given meaning and effect by British seamen. However, the reality of British principle is summed up by the remarks of one Member of Parliament, who, after acknowledging insular Britain's dependence on imported food and exported manufactures, goes on to say:

These considerations have always led us, practically, to violate our own theory of a commercial blockade, whenever the power to do so has remained in our hands . . . It is true we have maintained, for our navy, the traditional right and duty of a blockade, whilst (I beg your attention to the distinction) we have invariably connived at its evasion.<sup>17</sup>

### **III—AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON THE LAW: CONTINUOUS VOYAGE**

Although American influence on the Declaration of Paris was negligible, the maturing of her sea strength and the necessities of the American Civil War which broke out in 1861 were to leave a distinct American influence on the further evolution of the recognized principles of blockade. During that conflict, American courts were to apply a principle to blockade which had once been purely a colonial policy of the European mercantilist states, i.e., the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage.<sup>1</sup>

Shortly before the outbreak of the insurrection, the United States position with respect to the law of blockade was summarized in the instructions of the American Secretary of State to American Ministers abroad. The position taken reverted to the archaic view of the blockade as an extension to seaward of investing forces around localized military strongpoints. In the words of the Secretary:

The investment of a place by sea and land with a view to its reduction . . . is a legitimate mode of prosecuting hostilities . . . But the blockade of a coast, or of commercial positions along it, without any regard to ulterior military operations, and with the real design of carrying on a war against trade . . . is a proceeding which is difficult to reconcile with reason or with the opinions of modern times. To watch every creek, and river, and harbour upon an ocean frontier, in order to seize and confiscate every vessel . . . attempting to enter or go out, without any direct effect upon the true objects of war, is a mode of conducting hostilities which would find few advocates if now first presented for consideration.<sup>2</sup>

This interpretation was one not only substantially out of step with the distilled theory of the previous centuries but one directly contrary to that adopted by the Federal forces in 1861. It is instructive only as one additional example of the readiness of states in the international community to lay whatever interpretation on ambiguous aspects of the law of nations as best serves their instant interests. In 1859, Cass was expressing an interpretation that would favor the commercial interests of the United States in any contest of major European naval powers; it represents merely a diplomatic gambit to compensate for America's weak naval strength as opposed to the European states. In 1861, however, the Federal Government found itself at war with a group of southern states whose maritime potential was miniscule compared to that of the North, and consequently we find the North quickly attempting to occupy the same "high ground" so firmly held by Great Britain vis-à-vis the United States. Once more, principle yielded to political reality.

President Lincoln acted within a week of the fall of Fort Sumter to proclaim on 19 April 1861, that the ports of the rebellious states from South Carolina to Texas were blockaded "in pursuance of the laws of the United States and the law of nations," later extending the blockade to the states of Virginia and North Carolina as their rebel status became apparent.<sup>3</sup>

Although the United States had refused to accede to the recent Declaration of Paris,<sup>4</sup> the question of effectiveness of the blockade was immediately a point of controversy, as the United States had long championed the principle of "effectiveness" as a determinant of legality. One historian has noted that in April 1861 the Federal Navy possessed only 35 modern vessels, and that only three steam-propelled vessels were immediately available for blockade duty.<sup>5</sup> Another points out that the length of the shoreline to be interdicted by this force was in excess of 3,500 miles, from Washington down the Potomac around to the mouth of the Rio Grande, and that it included 189 river mouths and harbors.<sup>6</sup>

It is easy to visualize the mixture of skepticism and outrage with which Britain and the other European maritime powers greeted the pretensions of the Federal Government! Truly, "an effective blockade on such a scale was a thing unprecedented, even in the operations of the foremost naval powers in the world."<sup>7</sup>

Nevertheless, the normal seaborne trade of the southern states declined immediately after the proclamation of blockade, partly because some neutrals acceded to it voluntarily and took their trade elsewhere, but more likely because of the normal dislocation of trade accompanying a shift from a peacetime to a wartime economy.<sup>8</sup> This reduction of trade and its effect on the price of cotton in Europe lent credence to the Federal claim to effectiveness of their skeletal sea forces in the early months of the blockade.<sup>9</sup>

Soon, however, the weakness of the Federal force, combined with the growing demand in the South for the import of the sinews of war, encouraged the development of enlarged trade efforts in defiance of the blockade. Since

under Anglo-American policies the liability to capture began for the blockade runner at the moment of departure on the illegal voyage, enterprising shippers sought to shorten this exposure to a minimum. The several neutral ports which closely surrounded the blockaded area, such as Bermuda, Nassau, Havana, etc., soon became entrepôts for the transshipment of goods bound in and out of the South. The arrangement facilitated specialization of shipping used in the trade, with fast, shallow-draft steamers used for the two- or three-day run in and out of the blockaded ports, and large, slow, and stout vessels used for the long ocean crossing to Europe.<sup>10</sup>

The Federal authorities now looked to the mercantilist Doctrine of Continuous Voyage as justification for the arresting of this trade. Union cruisers operated far offshore to back up the forces available for close-in observation of southern ports, and deliberately positioned themselves to intercept oceangoing traffic bound from Europe to the various neutral ports off the southern coast. They soon began to bring in for adjudication under prize law a number of neutral vessels, mostly British, which appeared from their cargoes and documents to be enroute to such ports. In the first announced decision, which was not appealed by the British owners, ship and cargo were condemned for attempting violation of the blockade. The U.S. District Court held that:

The cutting up of a continuous voyage into several parts . . . cannot make a voyage which in its nature is one to become two or more voyages, nor make any of one entire voyage to become legal which would be illegal if not so divided.<sup>11</sup>

A better-known case, that of the *Bermuda*, which was finally decided in 1865, is even more definitive of the Doctrine as applied by the American Courts. Intercepted on a voyage between Bermuda and Nassau, both neutral ports, the *Bermuda* and her cargo were condemned by the District Court for attempted blockade running. On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the decision was confirmed, because, in the words of the Court:

Successive voyages, connected by a common plan and a common object, form a plural unit. They are links in the same chain, each identical in description with every other, and each essential to the continuous whole. The ships are planks of the same bridge, all of the same kind, and all necessary to the convenient passage of persons and property from one end to the other.<sup>12</sup>

The most celebrated case of the war was that of the *Springbok*, which had been captured enroute from London to Matamoros, Mexico, a port adjacent to the Rebel port of Brownsville, Texas. On appeal, the Supreme Court confirmed the condemnation of the cargo only, saying:

That the voyage . . . was as to cargo, both in law and in the intent of the parties, one voyage; and that the liability to condemnation . . . attached to the cargo from the time of sailing.<sup>13</sup>

Two significant aspects of the *Springbok* case are worth noting. First, the initial condemnation had been based on evidence adduced from two other cases then in the process of being tried.<sup>14</sup> This violated the traditional principle that condemnation must derive solely on evidence adduced from the ship's papers or the responses of her officers or crew to interrogation. Secondly, the British Government openly approved the decision in its rejection of the request of the British owners for an expression of protest, by saying:

Having regard to the very doubtful character of all trade ostensibly carried on at Nassau, and to many other circumstances of suspicion before the Court, Her Majesty's Government are not disposed to consider the argument of the court on this point as otherwise than tenable.<sup>15</sup>

Some observers<sup>16</sup> viewed the absence of British protest as reflecting a sinister intent to let the method and decision stand as a precedent upon which to base future British actions, as in fact they did during World War I.

In the extension of the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage to blockade, the American courts had moved into an area without exact precedent; even in the colonial confiscations, no ship or cargo had been condemned during the first stage of an illegal voyage. Understandably, international jurists expressed general disapproval, and over the next several decades dozens of criticisms of the American action were delivered within the international law community. This wave of disapproval culminated in an expression by the maritime prize committee of the Institute of International Law in 1882 that such a doctrine, if allowed to stand, would "*annihilate*" neutral trade on the mere "*suspicion* that the cargo . . . may be transhipped . . . and carried to some effectively blockaded port."<sup>17</sup>

The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage was not a uniquely American contribution to the developing law, being founded in earlier British colonial practice, but its application to blockade by American courts opened the Pandora's box which had long served to contain in large measure the most volatile issues of neutral rights. By this action, the United States unwittingly contributed to the growing demand of all maritime powers for some consensual formulation of the law of maritime warfare, a demand which was realized shortly after the opening of the new century at the London Conference of 1908-1909. At that conference, the confused interpretations of centuries of experience would be clarified in a code of maritime warfare known as the Declaration of London—a code which even now in the 1960's stands as the only accepted formulation of the law of blockade and contraband.

#### **IV—PRECEDENT ENSHRINED: THE DECLARATION OF LONDON, 1909**

The Hague Peace Conference of 1907, at the suggestion of both the British and German delegates, adopted a Convention for the establishment of an

International Prize Court as a court of appeal from the national prize courts which alone had traditionally evaluated the lawfulness of captures made at sea in time of war. Before such a court could function, however, it was necessary for all maritime powers to agree on the standards of maritime warfare which the Court would be required to enforce. Accordingly, Great Britain suggested that a conference of such states be assembled in London in late 1908 to formulate "rules which, in the absence of special treaty provisions applicable to a particular case, the Court should observe in dealing with appeals brought before it."<sup>1</sup>

Such a conference did convene in November 1908, and proceeded to devise a code of maritime warfare which was generally acceptable to the representatives of the maritime community. It was issued in February 1909 as the Declaration of London.

The Declaration was the first, and only, exhaustive compilation of all the aspects of maritime warfare which had for so long divided the maritime powers of the world. Even though the Declaration ultimately failed to be incorporated formally into the law of nations, it remains even today as the basis for the current international law on blockade, contraband, and neutral maritime rights.

The Declaration treated the matters of blockade and contraband quite extensively, devoting 44 of its 71 Articles to those topics. In brief, it confirmed the 1856 pronouncement of effectiveness as the test for legality of blockade and, contrary to the wishes of the United States,<sup>2</sup> forbade the application of the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage to blockades, reserving it for use only against absolute contraband.<sup>3</sup> Further, the Declaration forbade interference by blockading forces with access to neutral coasts or ports, a point much sought after by the northern European neutrals.<sup>4</sup>

When the Conference adjourned on 26 February 1909, the delegates returned home feeling that they had contributed to a great stride forward in the regularization of international affairs. However, despite Britain's role as sponsor, the publication of the Declaration while pending ratification brought great opposition by many Britons who saw it as an abdication of British power.<sup>5</sup> When the House of Lords failed to enact a bill in support of the International Prize Court in 1911, the Declaration was effectively rejected. Since Britain had failed to take the initiative in ratifying the Declaration, the remaining powers saw the futility of attempting to consider it as a viable segment of the law of nations, and the Declaration began to gather dust on the shelves of law libraries throughout the world.

Nevertheless, the Declaration did exist as the most recent consensus of the law of maritime war when World War I broke out in 1914. Further, since British representatives had contributed to its construction and had endorsed its provisions at the close of the Conference, the maritime powers of the world looked on the defunct Declaration as "not merely a codification of law," but as a "declaration of British maritime policy."<sup>6</sup>

Although this appraisal may have been accurate under the conditions existing in 1909, it appears that when faced with the actuality of war with the Central Powers in 1914, Britain realized that a blanket acceptance of the Declaration would be inimical to her national interest. Consequently, she announced on 20 August 1914, that the Declaration would be the general basis of her maritime policy during the war but "with certain modifications."<sup>7</sup> These modifications ultimately rendered impotent the most significant advances made under the Declaration, from the point of view of the neutral maritime states. By 1918, the terms of the Declaration aimed at protecting neutral rights had been honored more by their breach than their observance. With respect to the detailed principles of the law of blockade so extensively set out in the Declaration, Britain avoided their restrictions simply by not declaring a formal blockade. The rationale was quite pragmatic, although not expressed openly until long after the war. From the British view,

A formal declaration of blockade was deemed inadvisable for strategic and legal reasons; naval experts realized that we could not operate successfully in the Baltic with any continuity . . . . Moreover, the Baltic is only one of the commercial gates into Germany, and much of her trade arrives via Rotterdam . . . . Thus, it would be wiser not to announce the word 'blockade.'<sup>8</sup>

The prewar views of at least one British naval authority had recognized before 1911 that the realities of modern war had outstripped the detailed legalisms of the Declaration. After noting the practical impossibility of maintaining a close blockade against a continental enemy in the face of submarines, torpedo boats, and mines, this prescient naval officer went on to assert that the doctrine of blockade had become merged within a larger doctrine dictated by 20th century necessity—that of total economic war. Pointing out the particular sensitivity of both Britain and Germany to attack through their commerce, he went on to outline proposed British actions in the event of a war with Germany on the assumption that the terms of the London Declaration could be ignored or avoided. He advised:

In that case, our obvious course, to be adopted as soon as the naval situation permitted, would be to declare a blockade of the North Sea ports, and simultaneously to make a sweeping declaration of what was contraband, including all the principal raw materials . . . . Neutral vessels would be rigorously held up and examined . . . the doctrine of continuous voyage would be rigorously applied.<sup>9</sup>

The British actions after 1914 closely paralleled this program with all manner of additional devices employed in the effort to completely cut off all German sea commerce. These activities greatly antagonized the neutral trading powers but ultimately resulted in the total disruption of German economic strength and starvation for her population. Despite an intention early in the war to remain within the generally accepted rules of the Declaration, by 1915 the effects of new technology had begun to be exerted,

and both Germany and Britain embarked on open and unrestricted economic war against the other's commerce. It might be suggested that the only principle of international law which was strictly observed throughout the war was that of necessity, whereunder all manner of heretofore reprehensible actions could at least be rationalized.

The enactment of the Declaration, its failure of ratification, and its ultimate rejection under the stress of modern technology are all significant to this study, but it seems specious to berate the obvious direct contribution of these events to the thesis of this paper. It seems more profitable to point out some of the less obvious lessons to be drawn from this experience.

The code of maritime war hammered out by the delegates to London in 1908-1909 has made a contribution to the developing law of nations. It is instructive primarily as a codification of historical experience, and also as example of the considerable risk inherent in the enshrinement of precedent without regard either to the special circumstances of its creation or the immediate realities of existing technology and politics.

## **V—CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW**

The evolutionary process described in earlier chapters has remained essentially at a standstill since the abortive London Declaration of 1909. Despite the failure of the Declaration to be formally adopted by the international community, and despite the almost universal rejection of its key principles during the major wars of this century, the terms of the Declaration are yet considered to be an acceptable expression of the developed law of maritime warfare. This paradox is explained by the customary practice of the international legal profession of regarding all such consensual agreements among states as contributory to the formation of law. In its view, the Declaration itself is meaningless as a matter of law; but it is significant still because it represents the then-current views of the international community and, thus, can be used as a standard against which to compare state practices since that time. Thus, it is common to find heavy reliance placed by jurists and publicists on the terms of the Declaration in their extensive writings on the subject of maritime warfare.

There are, therefore, some number of fundamental characteristics which a given instance of blockade must display if it is to avoid condemnation by the international jurist and thus command the respect and cooperation of the community of nations which inhabit the modern world. These characteristics are derived from the terms of the entire developed body of the law, including the London Declaration which so conveniently reflects previous experience. It will be meaningful, then, to review those characteristics given the greatest significance by those two bodies of organized opinion: First, in order to complete the summary of the evolutionary process begun in the 17th century; and second, to permit a critical analysis of the continued validity of such criteria in the world of today.

The first principle generally applied is that the right to blockade is one deriving only to a belligerent power, solely as a function of the existence of that state of belligerency.<sup>1</sup> Modern publicists do recognize a similar institution under a condition short of belligerency known as pacific blockade, but generally dismiss this device of the 19th century as outmoded<sup>2</sup> and in any event not subject to the principles of commercial blockade under discussion.

Secondly, the acknowledged principle of the Declaration of Paris regarding effectiveness is regarded as crucial to establishing the legal sufficiency of a blockade since this element requires the application of actual naval power to enforce the blockade, and is the only principle truly accepted as a part of the law of nations on the subject of blockade.<sup>3</sup>

Further conditions must be satisfied, and they are again usually found to have been expressed in the London Declaration. Among them is the requirement that blockades must be confined to the coasts or ports of the enemy and that access to neutral ports may not be restricted.<sup>4</sup> A natural corollary to this requirement is the principle that captures may not be made if, at the moment of interception, the neutral vessel is enroute to a neutral port.<sup>5</sup> This, of course, prevents the application of the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage to blockades and constitutes a rejection by the international law community of American practice during the Civil War.

The issue of when a vessel becomes liable to condemnation for breach of blockade was left obscure by the London Declaration, which merely mentions the possibility of condemnation if "at the time of shipment of the goods" the shipper could be presumed or proven to have knowledge of intent to break the blockade.<sup>6</sup> However, it appears that at least Anglo-American jurists would support the practice whereunder liability would commence at the instant of departure for a blockaded port. Such a position appears to have been supported by American practice in 1917.<sup>7</sup>

In addition to imposing restrictive conditions on the blockading state, current law as expressed by the publicists continues to reward it by acknowledging its right to stop completely all sea traffic enroute to or from the enemy.<sup>8</sup> In the view of the international law community, no state has the right to seize or delay commerce on the high seas except under specific conditions associated with belligerent and neutral status; it is, therefore, asserted by them that the advantages to be secured by a state only under the precise conditions associated with the developed law of blockade are sufficient to warrant the insistence that states comply completely with these conditions when exerting naval power against commerce at sea.

It appears, however, that there are some fatal flaws in this argument, some of which are traceable to faults in the source of modern law and others arising purely from the modern status of international law itself.



First, it is clear that the technical conditions of the modern law of blockade are derived from the experience of maritime states since the 17th century, and that these conditions are the progeny of similar terms expressed in the Declaration of London. But, if the Declaration itself could have been regarded within only a few years of its formulation as "merely a body of rules for regulating naval operations against commercial systems that had disappeared,"<sup>9</sup> is it not valid to suspect that a modernized form of that code is equally contaminated by that charge of anachronism? In short, does the view of blockade expressed by modern writers agree with the realities of the social and economic system which it seeks to regulate as sound international law must do,<sup>10</sup> or is it so far out of step with the reality that it needs to "be set to true time"?

## **VI—BLOCKADE IN THE COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT**

It has been shown that the developed law of blockade has evolved parallel to and coordinate with that body of rules generally referred to as international law or the law of nations. The general subject, international law, is one of enormous scope and importance in the modern world. However, it is also one of broad controversy, imprecise both in acceptance and application—a thicket into which a layman may proceed only with great caution after accepting the sure knowledge that at least as many authorities in the field will disagree with him as may be inclined to agree with his views. However, it is necessary to at least express some general views about the institution in order to analyze the position in its context of the modern law of blockade.

First, international law must be a tool of world society to be applied in regulating the political and economic affairs among the member states of that society. Historically, the applications of this tool have met with varying degrees of success and cooperation. Generally, the greatest success has occurred in applications to matters of obvious benefit to all states, such as in the establishment of rules for the prevention of collisions at sea and the principles governing the exchange of diplomatic and consular agents. Further, it appears that international law has shown the ability to grow in usefulness with the passage of time. Those of a legalistic turn of mind might suggest that this growing utility arises primarily from the parallel growth of custom and precedent, touching on an ever-wider scope of matters of interest to state relations. It seems more believable, though, to attribute the growing influence of the law to the increased recognition by states of the necessity for members of international society to get along with one another in their mutual self-interest. Additionally, it appears that this recognition of mutual interest is directly attributable to the enlarged economic and social interdependence of the states within the community.

However, it may be that the law has become more effective, and, whatever theories one might wish to credit with the responsibility for improved performance, it remains clear only that such a body of "law" exists, and that it is respected and obeyed by states in varying degrees. If it is necessary to correlate this variable acceptance with *some* factor, it readily appears

that, at least in the past, obedience and respect for the law has generally been a function of state power and the interpretation of national interest. it must be admitted that this situation seems reasonable to the individual observer in the light of his own experience with his fellowmen.

This last generalization, at least, would seem to be borne out by some members of the juristic community who have considered the revised status of the law of nations in the environment of the world of the Iron Curtain and the cold war. Regarding the historic evolution of the law of nations itself, one author states that "international legal norms underwent constant re-interpretation and development—generally keeping in step with the evolving needs and policies of the stronger states."<sup>1</sup> Another, addressing himself more directly to the polarized nature of modern world politics, observes that "a realistic analysis of the limited scope for international law in East-West relations implies that ultimately, these relations are not governed by law, but by power."<sup>2</sup> The most chilling confirmation of the observer's assumption of a "power and self-interest" theory to explain the applicability of law in the modern context is provided by the words of a Soviet jurist, who said in 1948:

Those institutions in international law which can facilitate the execution of the stated tasks of the USSR are recognized and applied by the USSR, and those institutions which conflict in any manner with these purposes are rejected by the USSR.<sup>3</sup>

How then should the law of blockade be regarded in an era characterized by such apostasy toward an institution which once was viewed with almost the same blind faith accorded religion? If the law of blockade be a part of the law of nations, and if that law of nations can be expected to command the adherence of states only so long as those states remain convinced of the self-advantage of such adherence, it would seem that the law of blockade may be regarded as binding only insofar as its tenets reflect the reality of modern politics and economics. Wherever the developed law of blockade can be shown to rest on precedent no longer valid in modern society, it should be adhered to only if such adherence is in the national interest. Preferably, such aspects of the law should be rejected, and newer and more timely principles should be enunciated in order to bring that doctrine to a more logical maturity.

In keeping with this view, let us evaluate the elements of the law of blockade as it seems to exist in the eyes of modern writers and jurists and see if it, in fact, conforms to the social order which it is intended to serve.

First, it is contended that the right to blockade is a belligerent right only; that is, one which may be exercised only by a nation in an acknowledged state of war with another. The essence of the point is that legality (i.e., general approval by the states of society) can attach only to a blockade proclaimed as an act of war. However, there now appears to be some doubt that *any* act of war can be regarded as "legal" because of

the direction taken by the body of international law after World Wars I and II. Beginning with the Covenant of the League of Nations after World War I,<sup>4</sup> progressing through the Pact of Paris in 1928,<sup>5</sup> and culminating in the Charter of the United Nations signed in 1945,<sup>6</sup> the international community steadily progressed toward the official banishment of war as an acceptable "legal" means of solving international differences.

At least one authority considers that the ancient right of states to make war in the "traditional sense is definitely ruled out" under the Charter of the United Nations since the use of force for the settling of disputes is reserved to the Security Council by that agreement.<sup>7</sup> Thus, in a strict sense, no degree of legality can be attached to any violent act, excepting only acts taken in self-defense.

However accurate this interpretation may be, additional grounds seem to exist for claiming legality for a blockade not declared as an act of war under the sanction of belligerent right. The status of belligerence exists under law simply as a means of describing the condition of states not at peace. That is, it appears to be based on the inability of the early jurists or publicists to conceive of states existing in a condition other than that of war or its opposite, peace. There is, however, some evidence indicating the recognition by a measurable segment of opinion of a third status, beyond that of peace yet short of war. For example, as early as 1907 the English jurist Westlake considered that such a condition could exist, observing that "acts of force are not war unless either a government does them with the *intent* of war or the government against which they are done elects to treat them as war."<sup>8</sup> A more recent publicist expressed the idea more concretely by stating that "there may be . . . a state of 'intermediacy' between peace and war . . . characterized by . . . hostility between the opposing parties . . . but accompanied by an absence of intention or decision to go to war."<sup>9</sup> In a comprehensive discussion of the matter, another eminent authority conceded the significant advantage of recognizing such a status of intermediacy to be that it could be endowed with "legal consequences" similar in force and effect to the two traditional conditions.<sup>10</sup> In the view of another author, such legal consequences might "include limited restrictions on the freedom of the seas hitherto recognized only in war but falling short of full scale blockade."<sup>11</sup> It is clear from these observations that such a state of intermediacy could exist only where the parties to the dispute were unable to resolve it within the purely peaceful means now available under modern international law yet were unwilling to extend the tension to a complete war status. Is it not equally plain that many such situations can and will occur as a result of the Soviet-American contest for world leadership? Further, in view of the great expansion of the Soviet merchant marine in the last decade<sup>12</sup> and the expressed intention of the Soviets to support "wars of national liberation" wherever occurring, is it not probable that confrontations at sea will become commonplace in the future between the naval forces of the West and Soviet seapower? Already the Cuban "quarantine" crisis of 1962 appears in retrospect as an obvious example of a condition of intermediacy. Because the status of that time had not been widely enunciated, the condition was not so easily recognized, nor even now

has it been generally accepted as a principle. Yet, it would seem that such a status must ultimately be recognized, as so many others have been in the past, because of the reality of political and economic circumstances now abroad in the international community.

Another characteristic of the law of blockade which might be open to question in the light of modern experience is that provision forbidding interference with free access to neutral ports. In discussing this provision, it might first be observed that it, above all others, seems to have been honored more in the breach than in the observance almost from the day of its formulation in 1909. In World War I all pretense of compliance with this principle was dropped after early 1915 by Great Britain.<sup>13</sup> The reality of her position on the subject was expressed at a later date in terms clearly recognizing the dominance of self-interest over principle. At that time one authority stated:

. . . the extent of a belligerent's right to interfere with sea-borne commerce is conditioned by the extent of his command of the sea, and that the real principle underlying the idea of blockade is the right of a belligerent to deny to the commerce of his enemy the use of areas of sea which he is in a position effectively to control.<sup>14</sup>

Associated with the dictum that blockading forces may not interfere with traffic enroute to and from neutral ports is the requirement that no vessel may be seized for breach of blockade if she is first encountered on her way to a neutral port. That is, the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage may not be applied to blockade.<sup>15</sup> A cursory review of world history since 1914 would reveal that the practice of states at war during that period has been quite directly the opposite from that intended by both these requirements. In both world wars the commerce of neutrals and belligerents alike was attacked mercilessly with all of the means available to the contesting powers. There does not seem to be any reason to suspect that such rules would be observed by the parties to any future contest between the major antagonists now dominating world politics.

In point of fact, it seems ludicrous to contemplate the possibility of any meaningful observance of the "legal" code of blockade in the current or predictable future state of political reality. It is clear that the rules of blockade came into existence solely to protect the ordinary sea commerce of neutrals and to regulate the circumstances under which such trade could be interrupted. The rules derive out of a 19th century legal regime—a regime oriented toward *regulating* the conduct of states in war and peace.<sup>16</sup> But modern international law, of which blockade is a part, no longer seeks to regulate war but to *prevent* its occurrence. The formation of a world organization dedicated to this end has effectively ended the issue of neutral rights at sea in war by outlawing war and by the implied denial of the status of neutrality in the face of armed conflict by any member of the organization. If neutrality as a legal subsystem in international law is inconsistent

with the collective security system of the United Nations as alleged,<sup>17</sup> then observance of rules created as part of that subsystem have at least become optional if not completely unnecessary. Certainly, in view of the expressed intent of the Soviet Union to observe only those portions of the law of nations which are consistent with its wishes, it would be wise for other states to reserve to themselves the degree of observance to be given to patently outdated rules of maritime war.

## VII—CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Under the simplified circumstances of antiquity, combatants recognized the necessity of depriving the enemy of supplies and reinforcements essential to his continued resistance. As society grew more complex and economically more interdependent, the realities of international politics dictated that some concession be made to nonparticipants to retain the support their supplies would provide for warlike operations by both sides. Such concessions led to the concept of neutrality and ultimately became thoroughly circumscribed with technical conditions under which neutrals might continue trade with any belligerent they could reach. But the continuing evolution of international society resulted in widening the scope of wartime operations, as individual states accrued great military power, they acquired the ability to destroy completely the social and economic fabric of their enemies, and war had become a matter of national survival by the beginning of the 19th century.

Under these classic rules of neutrality, the right to blockade an enemy was a valued tool of the belligerent, for only by complying with certain accepted principles associated with the institution could he deprive his enemy of commerce with the general acquiescence of the world society. However, as war became more total, the once simple rules of blockade became more and more complex until the technicalities imposed in the name of neutral rights obscured the fundamental purpose of the institution itself—to cut off an enemy's commerce and thus weaken or starve him to the point of submission. As the law grew out of touch with the realities of power and politics, states which had the naval strength and the national will to survive began to ignore, corrupt, or circumvent the principles so carefully constructed by the scholars and legalists. The determining factors of compliance with the laws became those of self-interest and naval power—tempered only by the ability of a state to recognize its own long-term self-interest. Principle yielded to power and necessity, and the emergence of the 20th century concept of total war sounded the tocsin for any carefully drawn rule which conflicted with the necessities of such conflict.

The body of international law which exists today represents the resultant of forces generated by conflict of the international state system since the 17th century. It grew in an environment of constant change, but the rate of such change remained fairly slow until recent decades. Many of its precepts are rooted in economic, social, and political experiences of the last century—and the law of blockade is peculiarly representative of this fault.

Speaking of international law in general, one writer has said:

To the majority of the writers and exponents of international law, contemporary changes appear as extensions and modifications rather than as basic challenges to the structure of international law and relations. It is submitted that the extent of the structural changes in international relations in our time requires a far more basic reorientation in our thinking in international law.<sup>1</sup>

Such a basic reorientation is necessary at this time with regard to the law of blockade. If the historic status of "neutrality" can be regarded by some authorities as extinct, why cannot a new status supersede it? If armed confrontations between East and West are accepted by the international community as being something other than "war" in the traditional sense solely because the contestants have no intention to engage in war, then some status under law should be accorded to the condition. Within such a new category of law arising from the circumstances of the society it is intended to serve, there would be a place for a new code of maritime war—a code which would reflect 20th century conditions rather than the outmoded precedents set in an era which could not even conceive of a totally bipolarized world. It appears to be manifestly clear that such a code would contain rules for the conduct of operations against commerce at sea. Whether such actions be called blockade or "quarantine," commerce warfare will always remain as a tool of seapower, and a workable code for its conduct could only benefit all of world society.

We are in an era of "limited war" because the realities of "total war" in the nuclear age are too grotesque to consider as real possibilities. The one characteristic of the 1962 Cuban "quarantine" which drew general approval from the world community of nations was its controlled and limited nature.<sup>2</sup> And one view expressed with regard to the selection of the quarantine method in response to the Soviet challenge of that autumn remains valid today. Discussing the President's reasoning on the selection of this action, Theodore Sorensen has said of the operation:

Whatever the balance of strategic and ground forces may have been, the superiority of the American Navy was unquestioned; and this superiority was world-wide, should Soviet submarines retaliate elsewhere.<sup>3</sup>

What is proposed herein is simply that some form of sea operations against commerce be sanctioned despite the absence of a traditional condition of belligerency. If ever a traditional war erupts between the major antagonists of the modern world scene, the issue of neutral rights at sea will be academic even for the survivors. Some form of conflict seems to be a reasonable expectation in the future as it even now exists in South-east Asia, and, therefore, some provision should be made by the international community to regulate the application of seapower in such conflicts.

The most vociferous retort to this proposal may very well be based on its apparent suggestion that America abandon its traditional advocacy of "freedom of the seas," and so some brief observations are appropriate on that subject.

Freedom of the seas, in the classic Wilsonian sense, means those rights which we believe have accrued to all states as a result of British policing of the oceans in the decades since Trafalgar. The basic concept of freedom of the seas presupposes the dominance of a naval power so disposed as to make such freedom possible for itself and others. That Great Britain was such a power is borne out by study of naval history. As Bell remarks, "Great Britain was recognized to have protected the usages and customs of Europe [and consequently all of Western society] by her unflinching resistance to the Napoleonic empire."<sup>4</sup> Now, with Britain eclipsed by modern U.S. naval power, the burden of protecting, exploiting, or refuting those rights associated with the concept of "freedom of the seas" lies with the United States under the same grounds that they once devolved upon Britain. It is clearly the duty of such power to be exercised in defense of the concept when threatened by a power which might not act to preserve such freedom, but to hamper or destroy it. All states have recognized the need to accept restrictions on the usual freedom to use the sea when war has broken out between maritime states.<sup>5</sup> Such restrictions imposed in times of nominal peace would undoubtedly generate widespread outcry by the maritime states of the world, but historic experience indicates that under the pressing circumstances now at issue (for example, in Vietnam) that such a move by the United States would not long be opposed by states having a sincere interest in preserving the freedom which we have long championed at sea.

It is, therefore, proposed that the United States take the initiative in forcing the modification of the traditional laws associated with the institution of blockade: First, by a unilateral statement that the existing doctrine is inconsistent with the needs of modern society; and, second, by proposing appropriate modifications to the doctrine. Such action should be followed by the announcement of a naval "quarantine" of the port of Haiphong in North Vietnam, including the application of the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage to designated contraband at least to the British Crown Colony port of Hong Kong, where it has been observed that much of the Haiphong commerce "originates."<sup>6</sup> Such action could be tied in with the recent and continuing efforts of the United States to secure peace in that area by: (1) announcing the naval quarantine to be a more humane substitute for the aerial bombing campaign recently resumed; and (2) calling upon all states who have expressed disapproval of the bombing action to join with the United States in carrying out the quarantine operation.

One precedent of the historical law of maritime warfare seems most applicable even today, and that is the argument in favor of exceptional measures being valid when states find themselves engaged in an "exceptional" struggle. Writing of the events at sea in 1689, Samuel Puffendorf acknowledged that powers engaged in defense of the religions

liberty of Europe were not required to observe ordinary rules of capture; again in 1792, it was claimed, with some justice, that "extraordinary rigours were justifiable against a regicide government [France], who were themselves contemptuous of the law of nations."<sup>7</sup>

The United States is today engaged in an exceptional struggle for which there are few hard and fast rules. If we must act to set new precedents on the ground in the face of this need, we should equally act to set precedents on the seas. Both actions will stand to guide nations in the future.

In the words of one commentator:

United States naval power makes freedom of the seas possible. During periods of belligerence, that freedom is subject to control. The bloody Ho Chi Minh trail is long and winding. It begins at sea.<sup>8</sup>



## FOOTNOTES

### Introduction

1. Henry Ward Beecher, *Life Thoughts*.

### I—Foundation of the Law and Custom of Blockade

1. John Westlake, *The Collected Papers of John Westlake on Public International Law* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1914), p. 325.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 316-317.

3. Lassa F. Oppenheim, *International Law: Disputes, War and Neutrality*. H. Lauterpacht, ed., 7th ed. (London: Longmans, 1952), v. II, p. 768-769.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 624-625.

5. Such materials later came to be known as "contraband," and as such have often become confused with the concept of Blockade.

6. Westlake, *Collected Papers*, p. 321.

7. Some evidence exists that the idea was not original with the Dutch. See, *Neutrality, Its History, Economics and Law: the Origins* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), v. I, p. 106. It is unquestioned that the Dutch made the greater contribution to the establishment of the doctrine, however.

8. Westlake, *Collected Papers*, p. 325.

9. John Westlake, *International Law* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1907), pt. II, p. 222.

10. *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, quoted in Westlake, *Collected Papers*, p. 324. See also Westlake, *International Law*, p. 222.

11. Westlake points out that there is no inconsistency here, as the word itself, although coined in the original Dutch *placaat* nearly a half century earlier, was not commonly applied in the technical sense until a later date. (*Collected Papers*, p. 330)

12. Westlake, *Collected Papers*, p. 326.

13. Bynkershoek, *Quaestiones juris publici*, i, 11. Quoted in Westlake, *Collected Papers*, p. 327.

14. Westlake, *Collected Papers*, p. 327. See also *Neutrality: Origins*, p. 111-112.

15. *Neutrality: Origins*, p. 113 ff gives good account of reactions of maritime neutrals and treaty development.

16. Westlake, *Collected Papers*, p. 328.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 330-331.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 332.

19. Herbert W. Richmond, *National Policy and Naval Strength, XVI to XX Century* (London: Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 10.

## II—British Seapower and Blockade

1. *Neutrality: Origins*, p. 82 ff. Summarizes the wars of the period and Britain's changing roles therein.

2. Archibald C. Bell, *A History of the Blockade of Germany, 1914-1918* (London: H.M. Stationery Off., 1937), p. 5.

3. Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire*, 10th ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1898), v. II, p. 199.

4. Grenville to Lord Auckland. Quoted in *Neutrality: Today and Tomorrow* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936), v. IV, p. 40-41.

5. Westlake, *Collected Papers*, p. 334.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 335.

7. Westlake, *International Law*, p. 230.

8. Great Britain, Lords of Appeal, decision in the case of the *Nancy*, quoted in Westlake, *International Law*, p. 230.

9. James Stephen, *War in Disguise*, 3d ed. (London: University of London Press, 1917), p. 18.

10. Carlton Savage, ed., *Policy of the United States toward Maritime Commerce in War* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1934), v. I, p. 1-10.

11. Madison to Monroe, 5 January 1804. Reproduced in Savage, v. I, p. 246.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 248-249.

13. Richmond, p. 11.

14. Savage, v. I, p. 118.

15. Westlake, *International Law*, p. 128.

16. Congress of Paris, "Annex to Protocol 23-Declaration." Reproduced in Savage, v. I, p. 381.

17. Letter from Mr. Cobden, M.P., to Henry Ashworth, Esq., 1862. Quoted in Westlake, *Collected Papers*, p. 357.

### III—American Influence on the Law: Continuous Voyage

1. For the colonial evolution of this principle, see Appendix I. The Doctrine had been previously applied to blockade in only one instance, during the Napoleonic Wars, but under highly specialized circumstances.

2. Cass to Mason, 27 June 1859. Reproduced in Savage, v. I, p. 402-412.

3. See Savage, v. I, p. 415-416 for complete text.

4. The United States refusal was predicated on the outlawing of privateering, and the refusal of the Congress Powers to agree to forbid the confiscation of private property at sea belonging to belligerents. See Savage, v. I, p. 76 ff for diplomatic exchanges on subject.

5. James R. Soley, *The Blockade and the Cruisers* (New York: Scribner, 1883), p. 27.

6. Allen Westcott, ed., *American Seapower since 1775* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1952), p. 109.

7. Soley, p. 27.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

9. See Seward to C.F. Adams, 6 March 1862, quoted in Savage, v. I, p. 439.

10. Soley, p. 35-38, describes development of this trade.

11. *The Dolphin*, 7 Fed. Cases 868. Quoted in Herbert W. Briggs, *The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1926), p. 45.

12. Quoted in Briggs, p. 54.

13. Quoted in Savage, v. I, p. 466.

14. The *Stephan Hart* and the *Gertrude*. Both ships held cargo for the same port as the *Springbok*, all of which was complementary in use and linked by common ownership.

15. Briggs, p. 68. See also Lord Russell's comment of 20 February 1864, quoted in Briggs, p. 67.

16. Notably Mr. L. Gessner, in *Zur Reform des Kriegs-Seerechts* (Berlin: 1875), quoted in Briggs, p. 68.

17. Quoted in Briggs, p. 78-79. (Emphasis in original)

#### IV—Precedent Enshrined: The Declaration of London, 1909

1. Arthur Cohen, *The Declaration of London* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1911), p. 6-9.

2. See Instructions to the Delegates to the London Naval Conference of 1908-1909, dated 21 November 1908. Quoted in full in Savage, v. I, p. 521-524.

3. See Savage, v. II, p. 163-179 for complete text of the Declaration. Specifically, see arts. 2, 19, and 30.

4. *Ibid.*, art. 18.

5. A number of contemporary writings reflect the intensity of the controversy. See particularly T. Gibson Bowles, *Sea Law and Sea Power* (London: Murray, 1910); Norman D. Bentwich, *The Declaration of London* (London: Wilson, 1911); Thomas Baty, *Britain and Sea Law* (London: Bell, 1911); and Arthur Cohen, *The Declaration of London* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1911).

6. Bell, p. 38. See also Marion C. Siney, *The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914-1916* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957), p. 8 ff.

7. Bell, p. 40.

8. Edward K. Chatterton, *The Big Blockade* (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1932), p. 28.

9. Captain M.P.A. Hankey, RN, Naval Assistant Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence, undated memorandum, extensively quoted in Bell, p. 20-22. Note the emphasis on cutting off of raw materials; practically all such materials had been specifically exempted from capture by the Declaration. (See art. 28.)

1. All definitive texts of International Law cited elsewhere herein set forth the discussion of the law of blockade in adjectival phrases such as "belligerent right," etc., and the subject is nowhere considered in any other context than as a portion of the law of war.

2. See Oppenheim, v. II, p. 144-149 for a representative view of the entire institution.

3. *Ibid.*, chap. II.

4. Oppenheim, p. 771. See also, Charles C. Hyde, *International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States*, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945), p. 2190.

5. *Declaration of London*, art. 19.

6. *Ibid.*, art. 21.

7. See *Instructions Governing Maritime Warfare, June 1917* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1918), p. 16-17.

8. See Hyde, v. III, p. 2211-2212.

9. Bell, p. 18.

10. Philip C. Jessup, *A Modern Law of Nations* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 1.

#### VI—Blockade in the Cold War Environment

1. Oliver J. Lissitzyn, *International Law in a Divided World* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1963), p. 7.

2. Georg Schwarzenberger, "The Impact of the East-West Rift on International Law," *Grotius Society, Transactions* (London: Longmans, Green, 1951), v. XXXVI, p. 232.

3. F.I. Kozhevnikov. Quoted by Lissitzyn, p. 16.

4. Articles 12 and 13. See complete text in Charles G. Fenwick, *International Law*, 4th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965), appendix A.

5. See Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., *The Record of American Diplomacy*, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1964), p. 520-521.

6. See Fenwick, appendix C.

7. Fenwick, p. 649-650. Also, under the "Uniting for Peace Resolution" of 1950, the General Assembly may act if the Council defaults on its obligation.

8. Westlake, *International Law*, v. II, p. 2. (Emphasis added)

9. Wolfgang G. Friedmann, *The Changing Structure of International Law* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 271.

10. Philip C. Jessup, "Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status between Peace and War?", *American Journal of International Law*, January 1954, p. 98-103.

11. Friedmann, p. 271.

12. C.R. Huan, "La Flotte Marchande Sovietique," *La Revue Maritime*, August-September, 1965, p. 981-1004.

13. Bell, chap. III.

14. H.W. Malkin, "Blockade in Modern Conditions," *British Year-book of International Law, 1922-1923* (London: Frowde, 1923), p. 87-88.

15. *Declaration of London*, art. 19. See also Herbert A. Smith, *The Law and Custom of the Sea*, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1950), p. 112.

16. See Fenwick, p. 667 ff.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 727, p. 729 ff.

## VII—Conclusions and Recommendations

1. Friedmann, p. 3.

2. *The New York Times*, 26 October 1962, *passim*.

3. Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 688.

4. Bell, p. 4.

5. Fenwick, p. 511.

6. See Raymond Moley, "Blockade Saves Lives," *Newsweek*, 8 January 1966, p. 60.

7. Bell, p. 5, paraphrases Puffendorf and an anonymous later writer.

8. Raymond Moley, "Freedom of the Seas," *Newsweek*, 27 December 1965, p. 74.

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## APPENDIX I

### THE RULE OF 1756 AND THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUOUS VOYAGE

European mercantilist doctrine in the 18th century asserted that colonies existed only to supply the mother country with raw materials and to provide a market for the processed goods of the homeland. In Britain, to prevent encroachment by outsiders in this profitable two-way trade, a series of laws had been enacted to deprive outsiders of participation in colonial trade, in part by requiring that all such trade be carried on in ships of the British flag. France and others had similar regulations for the trade of their colonies. When war broke out among the colonial powers, as it frequently did, belligerent flag ships and their cargoes became lawful prize. Under such circumstances, how was the mother country to continue to supply and be supplied by their overseas colonies?

The answer, of course, was to carry on colonial trade using neutral flag bottoms; but the right of neutral ships to carry enemy goods was itself a source of heated controversy among maritime powers, and even more so when belligerents employed neutral ships only to carry on colonial trade without enduring the risk of confiscation associated with their own flag.<sup>1</sup>

To confound this practice, British prize courts evolved what became known as the Rule of the War, 1756, under which neutrals were prohibited, by confiscation if intercepted, from participating in colonial trade in war if such trade were denied them in peace by the laws of the mother country.<sup>2</sup>

Hoping to evade this rule, neutrals and belligerent shippers conspired to make the colonial voyages in two distinct stages, the first from the colony to a neutral port, and the second from that port to the mother country. Fictitious transfers of ownership and actual or simulated transshipment of the cargo while in the interim port were often resorted to in order to disguise the true character of the voyage from intercepting cruisers. This practice permitted

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<sup>1</sup>For a general summary, see Richard Pares, *Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 1739-1763* (Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon Press, 1938), p. 169. The controversy on neutral rights stemmed from a fundamental difference between Continental and British jurists on the sources and character of international law. Pares (p. 148-162) disagrees with other authorities who assert that the issues were resolved before this time. See *Neutrality: the Origins*, v. I., p. 247.

<sup>2</sup>Pares, p. 180-204. See also *Neutrality: the Origins*, p. 153, where they describe the Rule as "one of the clearest examples of the economic basis of the law of neutral and belligerent rights. It was a measure adopted . . . to meet a definite economic problem."

them to claim that captures made during either segment of the voyage were illegal, since neutral trade to and from neutral ports was always allowed.

The prize courts responded with the development of the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage under which cargoes were condemned at any stage in the voyage, disregarding paper transfers and transshipments as "a fraudulent contrivance merely on account of the war to continue the original voyage and cover the goods of the enemy to their destined port."<sup>3</sup>


#### BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Lieutenant Commander James F. McNulty, U.S. Navy, holds a B.S. (Marine Engineering) from the Massachusetts Maritime Academy, a B.A. (History and Government) from Tufts University, and an M.S. (International Affairs) from the George Washington University. He has served as Engineering Officer on LST's and destroyers; he was Operations Officer and Navigator on the USS *Benham* (DD-796); and he commanded the USS *Kiowa* (ATF-72). In 1965 he served as Engineering Instructor at the Naval Destroyer School in Newport.

Lieutenant Commander McNulty graduated from the School of Naval Command and Staff at the Naval War College in 1966. He will report as Executive Officer to the USS *Samuel* (DE-1048).

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<sup>3</sup>Decision in the case of the ship *Young Gertruyde Adriane*, June 1764. Quoted in Pares, p. 221.



## *Professional Reading*

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

Chief of Naval Personnel (G14)  
Department of the Navy  
Washington, D.C. 20370

Commanding Officer  
U.S. Naval Station  
Library (ALSC), Bldg. C-9  
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Commanding Officer  
U.S. Naval Station  
Library (ALSC)  
San Diego, California 92136

Commanding Officer  
U.S. Naval Station (Pearl Harbor)  
Library (ALSC), Box 20  
San Francisco, California 96610

Commanding Officer  
U.S. Naval Station (Guam)  
Library (ALSC), Box 174  
San Francisco, California 96630

## BOOKS

Aron, Robert. *An Explanation of De Gaulle*. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. 210 p.

Robert Aron is a Paris publishing house editor and writer of contemporary French history. His qualifications for writing this book are enhanced by his experiences as a member of the French Resistance and of De Gaulle's administrative staff. Robert Aron is also a great, and sometimes critical, admirer of Charles de Gaulle.

May 11, 1940, the day after the German Army took the offensive on the Western Front, Colonel Charles de Gaulle was named acting commander of the Fourth Armored Division, which existed only on paper. Commencing with the Colonel's counterattack with a pickup force of stragglers and late arrivals against the onrushing Wehrmacht in the vicinity of Laon, France, Robert Aron reviews the subsequent major events in the life of this obscure French Army Colonel as he went on "to save France from the dictatorships of Hitler and Stalin" and from the political and economic disasters of the Fourth Republic. Rather than a lucid explanation of Charles de Gaulle, this resembles an apology. He is described as a complicated man of paradoxes who almost defies diagnosis. "Since De Gaulle never moves in a straight line, one never knows what he is doing until what he is doing is finished." De Gaulle is characterized as a sensitive and humane person, but when the Vichy Minister of the Interior was tried for collaboration by a military tribunal with special powers, De Gaulle, who believed the accused "did his best to counter the Germans and surrender as little as possible," insisted on a precedent-setting execution for "reasons of state." This is a frequently used, unalterable De Gaulle rationale, although he abhors totalitarian governments whose primary principle is the subjection of everything to reasons of state. De Gaulle's solution for the Algerian problem was a sudden reversal of policy to embrace independence. This misuse and deceit of the French Algerian leadership left them in the impossible position of having to honor contrary commitments and resulted in rebellion and some of the blackest days in French history; the Army was ordered to fire on Frenchmen whose only crime was their determination to remain French. Aron apparently feels that De Gaulle still bears grudges against the United Kingdom and the United States for their lack of support for his proclaimed leadership in place of Pétain's during the war, and that twenty years later, the General sometimes acts accordingly.

*An Explanation of De Gaulle* does shed considerable light on such aspects as the conflict of his authoritarian background and nature with representative government under a multiparty system; the General's foreign policy strategy and his attitudes toward different classes of allies; the essential elements of Gaullism and the chances for its continuing influence after De Gaulle inevitably departs the French political scene. In view of the author's doubtful premise that the ideologies of the United States and Soviet Union are obsolete and must be replaced, France is charged with the responsibility of exercising intellectual and moral authority to develop a substitute system of government. There is some

discussion of De Gaulle's concept of a United Europe under French hegemony, operating as a third power between the United States and the Soviet Union. One conclusion offered is that De Gaulle, despite his arrogant, erratic, arbitrary, and sometimes intransigent ways, offers the West a chance to gain the initiative and to institute needed, healthy change. This volume will provide the serious student of contemporary French history with essential information. Furthermore, for those in sympathy with Charles de Gaulle, who feel that he is a misunderstood visionary, that NATO under American leadership is wrong, that capitalism is obsolete, and that equality is more important than the freedom and rights of the individual, this book is recommended as quite agreeable.

R.E. WARNER  
Captain, U.S. Navy

Ferkiss, Victor C. *Africa's Search for Identity*. New York: Braziller, 1965. 346 p.

*Africa's Search for Identity* is basically a literate résumé of Africa's struggle from its release from the bonds of colonialism to freedom. The author expertly refines the setting of his literary endeavor by pointing out that the so-called "period of colonialism" was in fact applicable to but a few areas of the continent of Africa, while the larger areas were in essence occupied or dominated provinces. In these dominated territories the political authority was, for the most part, superimposed on the existing native society, and, in those instances where any degree of this authority was delegated, the ultimate responsibility was methodically retained by the metropolitan cliques or protectoral governors. As a consequence, this provincial and somewhat feudalistic approach to government has left the populace stranded in the mire of political conflict, sorely lacking the education and experience to govern with any extent of flexibility. In this same vein, those in political position do not possess the dimension necessary to react and politicize in order to resist, accept, or even compromise with the opposition as it emerges. Against this backdrop Dr. Ferkiss has impartially and effectively recreated the conglomerate Africa of today, a political arena saturated with volatile elements, reflecting the entire spectrum of economic and ethnological discord. Into this patchwork the author carefully weaves the threads of the pan-African movement and the cult of Negritude in the present surge of nationalism. Additionally, Ferkiss treats the urge for unity that was coincident with the rapid emergence of the free states. This urge is evidenced in the numerous abortive attempts—doomed to failure from the outset—by such uncertain groupings as Tanganyika and Zanzibar and the divergent and conflictive efforts of the Organization of African Unity and its French rival, the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache. The composite analytical model of the discourse includes a survey of the trouble spots of the Congo, the Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia, the United Nations and Chinese communism in Africa, and a substantial account of African-American relations.

Overall, this appears to be as careful and balanced an analysis of Africa as is possible in today's gyratory relations among infant nations. This book is recommended for its substance, impartiality, and interest and is considered well worth inclusion in any collective or research endeavor in this specific realm.

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Padelford, Norman J. and Goodrich, Leland M., eds. *The United Nations in the Balance*. New York: Praeger, 1965. 482 p.

This book is a reprint of the Summer 1965 issue of *International Organization*, a World Peace Foundation publication whose board of editors includes Professors Padelford and Goodrich. It is identical in text to the source except for slight changes in the Introduction, which remove association with the *International Organization* issue and which briefly note the sudden death of Adlai E. Stevenson, to whose memory the book is dedicated. In this challenging symposium, leading authorities provide a broad appraisal of the successes and failures in the United Nations' 20-year history and point to the problems that cloud its future. Its past is best summarized by the editors, who state:

The twentieth anniversary of the United Nations is a milestone meriting special recognition. That the Organization has come thus far is a tribute to the vision of those who drew the founding plans, a testimonial to the soundness of the guiding principles upon which it was built.

Its future is speculated on by Inis L. Claude, Jr., in the final paragraphs of the book:

We cannot be unconditionally certain that the United Nations has a future. We can only assert that there is a clear need for the Organization, a need that appears to be generally recognized, and that the Organization has developed a distinct usefulness, a usefulness that appears to be generally appreciated. The value of the United Nations for the future lies not in any prospect that it will become stronger but in the promise that it may become more useful . . .

The greatest potential value of the Organization lies, however, in its being used as an instrument of the whole body of states to promote the stabilization of international relations, the accommodation of divergent interests and aspirations, and the development of consensus and cooperation wherever possible.

Among the 28 eminent contributors are Francis O. Wilcox, Walter R. Sharp, Louis Henkin, and the editors.

R.B. BADE

Commander, U.S. Navy

Raskin, Marcus G. and Fall, Bernard B., eds. *The Viet-Nam Reader*. New York: Random House, 1965. 415 p.

*The Viet-Nam Reader* is a composite of articles and documents on American foreign policy and the Vietnam crisis. As might be expected, this *Reader* is an attempt by noted dissenters to present an impressive array of material concerning the present crisis in Southeast Asia contributed by both the supporters and dissenters, yet all aimed at corroborating their opinions and proposals. Following an introduction wherein the coeditors state their views on "The Issues at Stake," the book is separated into four basic parts: "The Crisis of American Foreign Policy"; "The Rise of the Viet-Nam Problem"; "The Second Indochina War," in which the central theme of the book is treated in four subdivisions; and "The Negotiating Position." Such notable authorities as Quincy Wright, Dean Acheson, George F. Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, Walt W. Rostow, McGeorge Bundy, Robert S. McNamara, Thomas J. Dodd, J. William Fulbright, Bernard B. Fall, U Thant, Charles de Gaulle, Wayne Morse, L.F. Stone, and Joseph Kraft are among those represented in this collection. Despite the extensive use of contributors in support of present policies, it is obvious throughout that this is a *textbook* for dissension. The coeditors' premise is well stated in their introduction, the tenor of their theme being contained in the second paragraph:

Escalation of the war in Viet-Nam, in the name of a new globalism has become the compulsive means to what is viewed in Washington as the best way to stop revolutionary movements from becoming Communist success stories—not only in Viet-Nam but in all of Asia . . .

In the conclusion entitled, "A Diplomatic Alternative to U.S. Policy," the editors offer what they consider as a "pragmatic" approach to reduction of involvement, an easing of tensions, the foundation of Southeast Asian confederation, and, in all, a return to peace.

While this reviewer will refrain from entering into a polemic discussion concerning the merits of the material and proposals, he does, however, submit that for the wealth of bibliographical material alone this book is highly recommended. *The Reader* will provide considerable depth and insight to the student of international relations, be he supporter or dissenter.

C.O. WAKEMAN  
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Stoessinger, John G. *The United Nations and the Superpowers*. New York: Random House, 1965. 206 p.

Professor Stoessinger analyzes the dynamics of the United States-U.S.S.R. interactions in the United Nations by choosing nine cases for study—instances where the superpowers played tug-of-war over the United Nations' constitutional construction, peace-preserving

mechanisms, and social-economic efforts. The veto, the Secretariat and the admission of members are discussed, as are Suez, the Congo, the International Refugee Organization, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The book is selective, not comprehensive, and the topics are chosen for the light they shed on the superpower relationship. The author concludes that both the United States and the Soviet Union used the United Nations as a vehicle for the advancement of national interests. The organization has generally been useful more for the Americans than for the Russians, because the United States has successfully involved the United Nations in more activities serving her national interest, and because the United Nations has often been persuaded to do collectively what the United States might have had to do individually. In assessing future trends, the author is optimistic. While the United Nations has some characteristics of a superpower pawn, it has nonetheless moved ahead with a vitality of its own, and the dominant role of national interests need not be an insurmountable obstacle to the growth of the organization. This is a pragmatic and scholarly analysis, highly recommended for any student of international organizations.

D.R. STEFFERUD

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Stone, Jeremy J. *Containing the Arms Race*. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966. 252 p.

Utilizing his experience gained as a member of the Hudson Institute and the Harvard Center for International Affairs, Mr. Stone treats the subject of disarmament from the very logical premise that any agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning strategic weapons must pose tangible mutual benefits as opposed to one-sided advantages. This basic theme pervades the five chapters of the book, which consider bombers, missiles, missile defense, and proposals to limit strategic force levels. Each chapter puts forth a policy suggestion and then evaluates the various considerations involved in implementation, particularly in relation to the financial, psychological, and security benefits that might accrue to either side. The author argues in concrete rather than the usual general terms and concludes that missile defenses should be avoided; elimination of heavy bombers should be contemplated through informal agreements; Soviet proposals for reduction of missiles to strictly limited numbers might be acceptable; and, finally, a five-year freeze on strategic weapons should be considered. Discussion is based on unclassified source material such as Congressional hearings, *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, *Missiles and Rockets*, and military writings from *The New York Times* and *Washington Star*; however, these are used in a very effective manner, and the data and rationale from which interpolations and assumptions are derived are clearly presented in the text or in footnotes.

Whether one will accept the arguments and conclusions presented or the statement in the foreword that "With this book available no



person need feel that he lacks the information required for a sound judgment on these issues," the book does seem to serve two very useful purposes—it focuses on some of the basic technical and political issues involved, and it reemphasizes the quantity of strategic information that may be obtained from unclassified sources.

**B.D. LEVI, JR.**  
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